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By Quincy Wright Professor of International
Law, University of Chicago
The American Dilemma
"The American Dilemma" has been used to refer to the incon-
sistency between American race relations and American democratic
ideals. It may also apply to the inconsistency between our inter-
national relations and our democratic ideals. In this sense the
American citizen has been said to face a dilemma: "How to main-
tain a proper balance between national security and individual
freedom in a continuing crisis of national defense." 1 Cold war exists
and is likely to continue to exist for a long time, if indeed, it does
not degenerate into the more serious condition of hot war. The
Soviet dictatorship needs to maintain among its population the fear
of an external enemy in order to prevent revolt from its internal
tyranny. There is evidence that the Politburo believes in the
Marxist ideology that teaches it to expect crises of depression and
decay within the surrounding capitalist countries eventually induc-
ing attack upon the communist state while capitalism is in the
last throes of dissolution. The Soviets also have a theory of revolu-
tion which urges them to be continually on the alert in order to
expand their power by taking advantage of weaknesses and revo-
lutionary conditions in other countries. This combination of neces-
sity, fear, and ambition can be expected to keep alive Soviet
pressure upon the democratic world. This will induce the democ-
racies increasingly to fear devastating attack as the Soviet weapons
improve and to intensify their defense preparations.
This preparation, however, has the tendency to convert the
democracies themselves into dictatorships. Rising expenditures tend
to governmentalize the economy, to centralize government—
thereby reducing the degree of local autonomy and individual free-
dom— and to augment the position of the executive, especially the
defense department, at the expense of the legislature and the courts.
The increasing role of the military, and its consciousness of the
Delivered April 12, 1951.
1 Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma, New York, 1944; Harold D.
Lasswell, National Security and Individual Freedom, New York, 1950, p. 1.
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needs of security and the dangers of subversion behind the lines,
tend to reduce civil liberties, to block channels of information, to
broaden the inquisitions of investigatory agencies, to reduce the
influence of public opinion and parties, and to create an atmosphere
of secrecy and suspicion. Freedom of communication, of science, of
economic enterprise, of social relations is likely to be diminished.
By this process the need for defense, if serious and protracted, tends
to convert free societies into "garrison states." 2
All states tend toward that condition in times of active and
serious war, but democracies usually react to recover liberty when
the war is over. The condition of continuous cold war may, how-
ever, be more corroding to democracy in that it destroys the
resilience which can normally be relied upon when the tension is
over. The Roman Republic gave way to temporary dictatorship and
then permanent empire after a long period of hot and cold war,
and its experience, according to Toynbee, has been characteristic of
all transitions of civilizations from a "time of trouble" to a "uni-
versal state." 3
From this point of view the dilemma can only be solved if the
citizen and the public official are continually aware of the needs of
both national security and of individual liberty, and of the incom-
patible tendencies of measures to meet these needs. Consequently
both citizen and official must ask, in considering any defense or
security measure: Does it involve taxation or inflation; centraliza-
tion of government; investigation, secrecy, and reduction of civil
liberties; or augmentation of the role of the military? And, if it
does, as is usually the case, does its gain for defense compensate
for the loss to freedom and democracy? Such a balance is clearly
difficult to maintain in the face of increasing international tension.
The public will demand that defense be put first. 4
~ H. D. Lasswell, "The Garrison State," American Journal of Sociology,
1941, vol. 48, p. 455. See also Lasswell, "The Interrelations of World
Organization and Society," Yale Law Journal, August, 1946, vol. 55, pp.
889ff.
3 Arnold J. Toynbee, A Study of History, Oxford, 1939, vol. 4, pp. 3ff.
4 Robert E. Cushman considers it possible to have both freedom and
security if the best minds of the country plot our proper policies and pro-
cedures. These he suggests might be guided by the following principles.
"We must resist the intrusion of military authority into the areas in which
the professional soldier in a democracy does not belong. . . . We must resist
the further extension of secrecy in scientific research and in government
affairs, except in cases of clearest necessity, and we should rescue from
official secrecy many things which ought to be open to public scrutiny and
criticism . . . We must protect the public security without establishing a
program of thought control which violates freedom of opinion, freedom of
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The Constitutions of the World and of the United States
Without disparaging the mode of thought which emphasizes this
dilemma, I want to suggest a somewhat different approach. I would
pose the question, not of adapting our necessities and our ideals
to each other under the pressure of Soviet aggressiveness, but of
better adapting the American Constitution and the World Con-
stitution to each other under the conditions of modern science,
technology, and civilization. The distinction between these two
points of view was illustrated in an address by Elihu Root in 1917,
soon after the United States had entered World War I. Root recog-
nized the inconsistency between domestic democracy and effective
foreign policy, which, he pointed out, had been emphasized by
Alexis De Tocqueville in his classical study of democracy in America
written in the 1830's. In this study De Tocqueville wrote:
Foreign politics demand scarcely any of those qualities which a democracy
possesses; and they require, on the contrary, the perfect use of almost all
those faculties in which it is deficient ... A democracy is unable to
regulate the details of an important undertaking, to persevere in a design,
and to work out its execution in the presence of serious obstacles. It can-
not combine its measures with secrecy, and it will not await the conse-
quences with patience. These are qualities which more especially belong
to an individual or an aristocracy, and they are precisely the means by
which an individual people attains to a predominant position. 6
A similar observation was recently made by Dr. Hans Morgen-
thau, also looking at foreign policy from an European point of view
with especial reference to the United States.
It is the peculiar quality of the conduct of foreign affairs in the United
expression, and freedom of association." Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,
March, 1949, vol. 5, p. 72. See also Walter Gellhorn, Security, Loyalty,
and Science, Ithaca, 1950.
5
E. Root, Proceedings of the American Society of International Law,
1917, p. 9, quoting De Tocqueville, Democracy in America, New York,
1862, vol. 1, p. 254. All governments in which there is not complete central-
ization of authority face some inconsistency between the international
responsibility of the representative authority and the domestic responsibility
of the legislative, executive and judicial organs. International responsibilities
cannot be discharged without action by the latter organs whose powers are
defined by the constitution and exercised under the influence of domestic
opinion likely to be inadequately informed on international affairs. The
difficulty increases in proportion as power is decentralized and influenced by
domestic opinion through constitutional establishment of separation of
powers, federalism, and democracy. See D. C. Heatley, Diplomacy and the
Study of International Relations, Oxford, 1919, pp. 55ff; Q. Wright,
Control of American Foreign Relations, New York, 1922, pp. 3ff; "Domestic
Control of Foreign Relations," in C. P. Howland, ed., Survey of Foreign
Relations, Council on Foreign Relations, New York, 1928, pp. 83ff: A Study
of War, Chicago, 1942, pp. 273ff, 824ff, 1045ff.
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States that it maximizes the weaknesses inherent in the formulation and
execution of foreign policies under democratic conditions and that it
aggravates these inherent weaknesses by some unique constitutional devices
and political practices.6
To illustrate this I need only refer to the behavior of certain
senators and congressmen in the winter of 1950 in attacking the
Department of State in a spirit, the partisanship of which was ex-
ceeded only by the lack of factual substantiation of the charges;
nevertheless the attack had considerable public support. The result
was to create a situation in which the administration, in conducting
policy in an unusually critical situation of foreign affairs, had to
pay more attention to the coming elections and congressional votes
than to the facts of the world as disclosed by the daily cables and to
the necessities of American security.
The point I want to emphasize, however, is Elihu Root's con-
clusion in respect to this inherent difficulty of democracy. He said:
So long as foreign affairs were to continue as they were carried on in his
day, De Tocqueville was doubtless right. It is because democracies are
not fitted to conduct foreign affairs as they were conducted in De Tocque-
ville's day that the prevalence of democracy throughout the world makes
inevitable a change in the conduct of foreign affairs. Such affairs when
conducted by democratic governments must necessarily be marked by
the absence of those undertakings and designs, and those measures com-
bined with secrecy, prosecuted with perseverence for which he declares
democracies to be unfit. 1
Many will say that such a change in the conduct of foreign
affairs is impossible to achieve. They will note that secrecy, threat,
and aggression are no less characteristic of international politics
today than they were in De Tocqueville's day. Power politics, they
will say, is thrust upon us, and we will have to adapt ourselves to
its necessities or die. 8 Root, however, did not think so. His answer
was that democracies must join together to build a regime of world
law. He had expanded upon this in his address in 1915. He noted
the inadequacy of the restraints of international law in the past
upon policies of power and aggression, but instead of despairing he
said the world must place more effective sanctions behind the law.
6
"Conduct of American Foreign Relations," Parliamentary Affairs,
vol. 3, no. 1. To similar effect see George Kennan, American Diplomacy,
1900-1950, Chicago, 1951, pp. 73, 93ff.
7 Root, op. cit.
8 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, New York, 1948, pp.
125ff; Kennan, op. cit., p. 95.
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Laws to be obeyed must have sanctions behind them; that is to say, vio-
lations of them must be followed by punishment. That punishment must
be caused by power superior to the law breaker; it cannot consist merely
in the possibility of being defeated in a conflict with an enemy; otherwise,
there would be no law as between the strong and the weak.9
In the third of a century since Root made these remarks there
have been efforts to follow his advice. The League of Nations
(1920), the Kellogg-Briand Pact (1928), the United Nations
(1945), the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials (1946), the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (1948), and the Uniting for Peace
Resolution of the General Assembly (1950) have been successive
steps in an effort to organize the world to support a law which
outlaws war and punishes aggression -— to make "the world safe
for democracy" by creating a power behind international law
which can redress the unstable balance of power between nations
in a shrinking world. 10 This is a step toward the democratic organi-
zation of the world expressed by President Wilson in 1918, "What
we seek is the reign of law, based upon the consent of the governed
and sustained by the organized opinion of mankind." 11
Must we write off the efforts of a generation to save democracy
by creating a world in which it can live at peace, and resort to the
policy, always destructive of democracy, of defending our state in a
world of unmitigated power politics? I do not think the case is
hopeless. Our difficulty is that we have not understood the com-
9 Proceedings of the American Society of International Law, 1915.
10 In his address of April 2, 1917 calling for war with Germany, Wilson
left the purport of this phrase ambiguous. On the one hand he referred
to "the rights of nations, great and small, and the privileges of men every-
where to choose their way of life and of obedience" implying that they
might not choose democracy, but on the other hand he said, "the peace
must be planted upon the tested foundations of political liberty" and "a
steadfast concert for peace can never be maintained except by a partner-
ship of democratic nations," implying that all nations must be democratic.
See J. B. Scott, ed., Official Statement of War Aims and Peace Proposals,
December, 1916 to November, 1918, Washington, 1921, pp. 89, 91.
11
Ibid., p. 351. Wilson's concept of the League of Nations became in-
creasingly insistent upon the democracy of its members and increasingly
antipathetic to the balance of power and special alliances as he abandoned
the concept of neutrality and neutral rights with which he had confronted
the belligerents at first. See address, September 27, 1918, ibid., pp. 399ff,
and Edward H. Buehrig, "Wilson's Neutrality Reexamined," World Politics,
October, 1950, vol. 3, pp. Iff. In his address to the Senate on January 22,
1917, Wilson attempted to reconcile "government with consent of the
governed," neutrality, freedom of the seas, the Monroe Doctrine, and oppo-
sition to entangling alliances and balancing of power with a "League for
Peace," "a community of power," and a "peace made secure by the organ-
ized major force of mankind." Scott, ed., op. cit., pp. 50ff.
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plexity of the problem. We have been too much obsessed with our
own culture and our own Constitution when we have thought of
a law governed world. We have tended to think of the ideal insti-
tutions of the world as our institutions made universal. We have
been too prone to think that a world "safe for democracy" means
a world all of which is democratic as we interpret the term.
We must think, instead, of the American society and the world
society as two entities, which are distinct, though they cannot be
separated because one contains the other, and which consequently
must mutually adapt to one another if either is to be secure. We
must ask how the world constitution may be modified to give
greater assurance that international law will be just and will be
observed, and how our Constitution must be modified in order that
we may preserve our basic institutions and may make our appro-
priate contribution to the maintenance of such a world.
The World's Constitution
I will not go into the arguments among the advocates of World
Federation, the supporters of the United Nations, the power
politicians and the isolationists. They all have concepts of a world
constitution, but, in the order I have named them, they exhibit
decreasing optimism as to the possibility of modifying it to suit our
particular desires.
The advocates of World Federation are the most optimistic but
their optimism becomes qualified as they experience the unwilling-
ness or incapacity of the Russians, the East Europeans, the Chinese,
and even the Indians, Southeast Asians, Arabs, and Latin Ameri-
cans to accept and operate the American concepts of civil liberties,
freedom of communication, free elections, and constitutionalism.
With such experience advocates of World Federation tend to nar-
row the base of the society they contemplate and to content them-
selves with efforts to federalize the North Atlantic Community or
the "free world," assuming that this quarter of the human race
will, if organized, be sufficiently strong to defend itself without
undue militarization from the three-quarters of the human race
which is left out and which includes within it the powerful, or-
ganizing urge of the Soviet Union. 12
12 See Clarence Streit, Union Now, 1938; the monthly periodical,
Freedom and Union, edited by Streit, and statements by Streit, Owen
Roberts, Will Clayton and others on Senate Concurrent Resolution 57 for
16
The isolationists, at the other extreme, beginning with a pro-
found pessimism about the rest of the world and a conviction that
the United States must live alone and like it, cannot wholly ignore
the advice of hard-headed strategists who insist that the Western
hemisphere and the off-shore islands of Western Europe and
Eastern Asia must be incorporated in any workable defense plan
for the United States. The strategists may even demand that the
"rimlands" of West Europe, the Mediterranean, and Southeast Asia,
be included, as first bastions of defense against aggression from the
Eurasian "heartland." 13 The isolationists cannot, however, overlook
the jeopardy to American institutions that such preparedness en-
tails. Air and sea power based on "an American Gibraltar" could
not indefinitely withstand attack from the remaining five-sixths of
the world's population and resources if organized against it, and,
if the off-shore islands and rimlands of the Eurasian continent are
to be used as bases, land forces to defend them will be necessary. 14
Neither the advocates of World Federation nor the isolationists
have really risen to a vision of the world as a whole. They offer no
solution for the dilemma between the necessities of defense in an
atomic age and the danger of becoming a garrison state. They only
urge that we preserve what we can of American liberties in an
almost hopeless situation. The extreme optimists and the extreme
pessimists meet with a somewhat expanded American federation on
the one hand and a somewhat expanded American empire on the
other facing the communist enemy whom they deem beyond the
range of morals or argument and in whose favor time may be
running.
The United Nations and International Politics
Between these extremes the students of the United Nations and
of international politics attempt to look at the world as a whole. The
Atlantic Union Federation, February, 1950, in Hearings, 81st Cong., 2nd
Sess., on Revision of the United Nations Charter, pp. 227ff. Certain world
federalists continue to believe in universal federation; see statements by
Cord Meyer, Jr., James Warburg, Alan Cranston, Senators Pepper, Morse,
Graham and others on Senate Concurrent Resolution 66, ibid., pp. 317ff;
Common Cause, a periodical published by the Committee to Frame a World
Constitution, and Stringfellow Barr, Let's Join the Human Race, 1950.
13 These terms have figured in the strategic ideas of geopoliticians like
Sir Halford Mackinder, Karl Haushofer and Nicholas Spykman.
54 See Herbert Hoover, A Cause to Win, The Freeman, 240 Madison
Avenue, New York, 1951, including five addresses, especially that of
December 20, 1950. See also statement by Representative Clare E. Hoffman,
in Hearings, cited, p. 479.
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first, believing that continued effort to influence opinion and to
perfect machinery can increase the security of all under law, are
somewhat more optimistic than the second. 15 Students of interna-
tional politics believe that equilibrium can be stabilized by astute
negotiation of agreements which will be reliable so long as their
observance is in the common interest of the parties. 16 The difference
between these two groups lies in the fact that the students of the
United Nations give more weight to the long run opinion of the
world, and the students of international politics give more weight
to the short run interest of the nations— but each recognizes that
there is both a long run and a short run, both a whole and parts,
and it is neither to be expected nor desired that the world will
absorb the nations or that any one nation will absorb the world.
Both of these groups appreciate the inevitability of national
diversities— whether they spring from climate and geography, from
population and living standards, from traditional culture and value
systems, or from forms of political and economic organization.
These diversities generate different and often inconsistent interests
which tend to lead to tension, conflict, and war as the world shrinks
and contacts among previously separated peoples increase. But both
of these groups also appreciate that all men have something in
common, including the desire to live, to increase their standards of
living, to enjoy their traditions and institutions and, in varied
degree, to be free to live as they want. They appreciate, further-
more, that all nations and governments have something in common
including the desire to serve their members and to increase their
power in order to forward these interests. These desires, both indi-
vidual and collective, may be frustrated by modern war. Out of
these common interests a world opinion supporting world institu-
tions may gradually develop, and, more immediately, diplomacy
may achieve agreements which will be observed so long as they
serve those common interests.
Both advocates of the United Nations and advocates of inter-
national politics emphasize particularly the significance of time in
15 See statements by Clark E. Eichelberger, Arthur Holcombe, H. F.
Armstrong, Quincy Wright, Clyde Eagleton, Mrs. Allen Mitchell and
Senators Paul Douglas and Homer Ferguson on Senate Concurrent Reso-
lutions 52 and 72, Hearings, cited, pp. 2ff, 348ff, 472ff.
10 Hans Morgenthau, "The Policy of the U.S.A.," Political Quarterly,
January-March, 1951, vol. 22, pp. 43ff; Q. Wright, "American Policy
Toward Russia," World Politics, Summer, 1950, vol. 2, pp. 463ff; W. T. R.
Fox, The Superpowers, New York, 1944.
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political and constitutional change. Major political changes can
hardly be achieved both rapidly and peacefully because of the im-
portant interests which they necessarily affect adversely. Such
changes may, however, be achieved peacefully if sufficiently gradual
to permit numerous minds to become accommodated and adjusted.
Consequently, any major reconstruction of the world order, how-
ever reasonable or even necessary it may seem in the light of new
technological conditions and dynamic opinions, should be con-
ceived only as a long run goal. So conceived it may be approached
gradually and perhaps deviously by solving short run problems on
their merits but with a steady bias in the direction indicated by
that goal. 17
Experience with the operation of the United Nations suggests
that its principles are not antithetic but supplementary to those by
which international politics has been conducted during the past
few centuries. Collective security is not world government in the
sense that universal law can be declared, applied, and enforced by
a world society with overwhelming power. That power does not
exist and cannot exist so long as certain combinations of members
of the world community rival that community in power. Under
such conditions the law against aggression can be enforced by
collective action only if diplomacy conducted by states or the
United Nations can prevent the aggressor from gaining and holding
allies, and can persuade most of the states to support the United
Nations in their own interests. Collective security cannot work if
every aggression is permitted to initiate a world war, but this need
not happen if jural policing is accompanied by a diplomacy intent
upon preserving equilibrium. Collective policing and careful diplo-
macy must proceed in parallel, not in sequence. The difficulty of
giving proper weight to each has been illustrated in the Korean
affair which began in June, 1950. 18
In proportion as the United Nations acquires a strength of its
own, by virtue of a growth of a world public opinion and of
" Quincy Wright, "On the Application of Intelligence to World Af-
fairs," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, August, 1948, vol. 4, pp. 249ff.
1S See especially the debate preceding passage by the Political and
Security Committee of the General Assembly of a resolution on January
13, 1951 proposing a cease fire to the Chinese Communist Government,
and on February 1, 1951 finding the Chinese Communist Government
guilty of aggression. Summary in Brookings Institution, Current Develop-
ments in United State Foreign Policy, January, 1951, vol. 4, pp. 39-52; see
also Quincy Wright, "Collective Security in the Light of the Korean
Experience," Proceedings of the American Society of International Law,
1951, pp. 165ff.
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effective procedures to assure the allegiance of its members to
their obligations, it may itself become an element in the balance of
power always on the side of law and order. The natural tendency
of states to coalesce against any of their number that is becoming
too powerful and is preparing for aggression may, therefore, be
strengthened and given greater preventive efficacy by the obliga-
tions and procedures of collective security. Viewed this way, col-
lective security, far from opposing the natural tendencies of inter-
national politics, contributes to the effectiveness of that tendency
and checks the opposite tendency toward universal conquest and
world empire. 19
Progress towards stabilization of the world by such a combina-
tion of law and diplomacy seems to imply widespread acceptance
of certain opinions including the following:
(1) No state, even the Soviet Union, is wholly unamenable to
persuasion by information and argument; consequently, negotiation
on some matters is always possible if there is communication. This
rests on the assumption that states act in accord with their interests,
that all states have numerous interests and that some of these
interests can be better forwarded by cooperation than by opposition
once they are mutually understood. Even belligerents negotiate with
each other on exchanges of prisoners, suspensions of hostilities and
armistices. 20
(2) Some communications between governments and some
understanding by each of the interests of others is possible and
19 Collective security does, however, differ from traditional international
politics in certain respects. Collective security relies on permanent rather
than ad hoc organizations and thus gives more weight to the status quo and
less to change. It also operates against any state guilty of aggression rather
than against a state that is becoming overpowerful and thus reduces the
tendency of international politics toward bi-polarization and eventual uni-
versal conquest. See Quincy Wright, "Accomplishments and Expectations
of World Organization," Yale Law Journal, August, 1946, vol. 55, pp.
870ff; A Study of War, pp. 749, 763, 781.
20 See Quincy Wright, "Some Reflections on War and Peace," Ameri-
can Journal of Psychiatry, September, 1950, vol. 107, pp. 166ff. Writers on
diplomatic practice generally point out that skillful negotiations may be
successful even in the most inauspicious circumstances. See Callieres, De la
maniere de negocier avec les Souverains, Paris, 1716, chap. 2, quoted
Heatley, op. cit., p. 239. Winston Churchill has frequently affirmed his hope
that negotiations may bridge the "gulf which yawns between the two worlds
now facing each other, armed and arming, reaching out for agencies which
might eventually destroy the human race." Parliamentary Debates, March
28, 1951, 5th series, vol. 473, pp. 203ff. According to Hans J. Morgenthau
(Politics among Nations, p. 444), "When nations have used diplomacy for
the purpose of preventing war, they have often succeeded."
20
desirable. Even the Soviet Union considers it worth while to com-
municate with others in the United Nations and occasionally to
reach agreement. The iron curtain is undoubtedly a serious obstacle
to a reduction of tensions but it may prove more penetrable to
methods resting upon mutual interest than to direct assault. 21
(3) Complete elimination of either of the great political struc-
tures of the world is unlikely, except as the result of a war which
might destroy either or both. Consequently, the coexistence of
these diverse systems is probable for a long future and both the
United States and the Soviet Union should adjust themselves to
that condition. Moderation of ideologies, postponement of objec-
tives and changes in domestic government are likely to occur in
time, to modify foreign policies, and to make such adjustment
easier. 22
(4) The trend toward a bipolar concentration of power with
all the instability which such a system implies is not inevitable and
much can be done to stem that tendency. 23
Among efforts to modify the tendency toward bipolarity, high
rank should be given to the refusal to identify communism with
Soviet policy and to identify democracy with United States policy.
It should be assumed that there may be communist states that are
not satellites of the Kremlin, and that there may be democratic
states that arc not allies of the United States. The first of these
identifications may be in accord with Soviet policy which seeks to
strengthen itself by assuming, and persuading the world to assume,
that all communist states are united under its banner. That as-
sumption may tend to make itself true, especially if the West,
because of it, seeks to "contain" all the communist states and thus
to drive them together. The case of Tito, however, indicates that
a communist government may act independently. The free world
should continue to ask itself, might Mao Tse-Tung do the same?
Premier Nehru, on the other hand, is attempting to indicate that
a government, at least partially democratic, can also act inde-
pendently. Such manifestations are to be encouraged.
21 Quincy Wright, "Freedom and Responsibility in Respect to Trans-
national Communication," Proceedings of the American Society of Inter-
national Law, 1950, pp. 95ff.
" George F. Kennan, "America and the Russian Future," Foreign
Affairs, April, 1951, vol. 29, pp. 35 Iff, reprinted American Diplomacy,
1900-1950, pp. 125ff. Quincy Wright, "American Policy toward Russia,"




If instead of the world polarizing into great structures center-
ing in Moscow and Washington, cracks began to occur simultane-
ously in both, and a ring of states acting independently began to
emerge between these two centers, a reduction of tensions could
be expected. 24 A neutralized Germany, if such an arrangement
could be achieved with confidence that it would endure, would
probably contribute more to peace than two halves of Germany
organized in each of the rival poles. 25
In this connection it is well to realize that the low living
standards of Asia may make a vigorous government leadership in
economic reconstruction and a vigorous discipline of the over-
abundant population, even though brutal, attractive to a people
that have known little but misery. It is perhaps wise to assume, as
does the United Nations Charter, that nations are sovereign and
equal and to derive from that the right of each to adopt whatever
ideology or form of organization it desires, so long as it makes its
choice independently and adheres to its duty not to engage in
aggression. 26
If belief in reason, communication, coexistence, and decentral-
ization of power can be spread, diplomacy may be able to alleviate
tensions and to create conditions which will permit the United
Nations to grow stronger and to reduce tensions still more. 27
The American Constitution
The American Constitution with its guarantees of civil liberty;
its checks and balances between the Congress, the President, and
the Courts; its reserved powers of the states; its processes of party
politics; its diverse opinions and its protracted debates before
decisions are reached, has difficulty in functioning in cold war.
These characteristics of the American Constitution, if observed,
may lead the government to fiddle or filibuster while Rome burns;
while subversives gnaw from within; while the propaganda,
24 Dewitt C. Poole, "The Balance of Power," Life Magazine, September
22, 1947, vol. 23, pp. 76ff.
25 James P. Warburg, You Can Still Act for Peace, Speak up Now or
Never, Current Affairs Press, 1950; Victory Without War, Current Affairs
Press, 1951.
26 Stringfellow Barr, op. cit.
"Quincy Wright, Yale Law Journal, 1946, vol. 55, pp. 8 7Off; Charles
Easton Rothwell, "International Organization and World Politics," Inter-
national Organization, World Peace Foundation, November, 1949, vol. 3,
pp. 605ff.
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diplomacy, and armies of dictators take over potential allies one
after another; and while the Politburo prepares snorkels and atom
bombs for the destruction of its enemies. I have referred to the
balance which the United States must maintain in the face of this
dilemma.'28 But let us ask ourselves: Is the American Constitution
equally unsuitcd for life in a stable, law-governed world com-
munity? Some current attitudes on constitutional issues suggest
that it is unsuited.
Perhaps we can agree that in a law-governed world community,
fundamental human rights should be respected, basic international
crimes should be punished, international trade and communications
should be relatively free, adequate forces should be promptly
mobilized against aggression, and in general governments and their
representatives should be legally and practically competent to make
and to observe commitments which the concensus of world opinion
deems essential for developing such a community and adapting it
to new conditions.- 1 '
Human Rights and the Constitution
A respectable body of legal opinion appears to fear that a
Covenant of Human Rights which did not go as far as the Con-
stitutional Bill of Rights would be unconstitutional if ratified by
the United States. It is argued that such a Covenant might reduce
the internal effectiveness of the constitutional guarantees.' 5 " This
argument seems to me legally unsound. Such a Covenant would
state a minimum standard and would not prevent any state that
became a party from giving more liberty to its citizens or inhabi-
tants. Constitutional or statutory guarantees would, therefore, be
unaffected provided they were no less favorable to the individual
than the Covenant guarantees.
Exceptions from absolute freedom of speech and press or other
civil liberties are acknowledged in all systems of law, including
that of the United States. The Supreme Court has acknowledged
28 Supra, note 4.
'"' This at least is the assumption of the United Nations. The more
fundamental psychological and sociological conditions underlying such a
rule of law are discussed in The World Community, Harris Foundation
Lectures, Quincy Wright, ed., Chicago, 1948, and Foundations for World
Order, Social Science Foundation, University of Denver, 1949.
3
" American Bar Association, Committee on Peace and Law through the
United Nations, September 1, 1951, pp. 26ff.
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among others, the exception of "clear and present danger to public
order." 31 It is to be expected that conditions will exist in some
countries which justify more government restriction on individual
freedom than is necessary in the United States. The world cannot
achieve the high standards of liberty maintained by the constitu-
tion of the United States at one jump— even the practice of the
United States is not always up to its constitutional principles. 32
Consequently it is not likely that a general Covenant on human
rights can be achieved unless the standards are somewhat lower
than those of the American Constitution. Insistence by the United
States that its standards must be accepted in such a Covenant
would prevent general acceptance of the Covenant and further-
more would manifest a failure of the United States to appreciate
that much variation in the relation of the individual to the state
exists in different parts of the world and complete uniformity is
neither to be expected nor desired. 33
On the other hand the permission given to sovereign states by
the International Covenant to make exceptions to individual free-
doms beyond those permitted the federal government by our Con-
stitution would not enlarge the powers of Congress. The constitu-
tional principle that Congress can legislate when necessary and
proper to implement a treaty obligation of the United States34 does
not permit Congress to legislate in violation of established consti-
tutional guarantees. A treaty permission to the United States is not
a constitutional permission to Congress nor is a treaty permission
a treaty obligation. 35 Even a treaty obligation, while it may extend
congressional power into the normal domain of the states cannot
permit what the constitution forbids such as encroachment upon the
guaranteed rights of individuals. 36 The normal powers of the states
are the residuum of governmental powers which remains beyond
31 Holmes, J., in Schenk v. U.S., 1919, 249 U.S. 47 and dissenting in
Abrams v. U.S., 1919, 250 U.S. 616 and Gitlow v. New York, 1925, 260
U.S. 652. See also Thomas v. Collins, 1945, 323 U.S. 516; Dennis v. U.S.,
1951, 341 U.S. 494, 503 and Herman Pritchett, The Roosevelt Court, New
York, 1948, pp. 275ff.
32 The Report of the President's Committee on Civil Rights, "To Secure
these Rights," Washington, 1947, pp. 13ff.
33 Margaret Mead, in The World Community, op. cit., pp. 51ff, 58ff,
66ff.
"Missouri v. Holland, 1920, 252 U.S. 416.
3r
' Quincy Wright, Control of American Foreign Relations, pp. 55, 71.
30 Secretary of State Marcy in the Dillon Case, Moore, Digest of Inter-
national Law, vol. 5, p. 167; Wright, Control of American Foreign Rela-
tions, New York, 1922, p. 81.
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the powers, including the treaty-making power, delegated by the
constitution to the federal government. The constitutional rights
of individuals, on the other hand, like the guarantees to states of
territorial integrity and republican government, constitute a posi-
tive limitation upon the exercise of power by any organ of the
federal government, and in most cases by the states also. 37 Legally,
therefore, there seems to be no ground to fear that an international
Covenant of Human Rights would impair the Constitutional Bill
of Rights even though its standards were lower. While the moral
and political influence of such a Covenant might be undesirable
if it were assumed to establish an absolute standard of justice, this
effect would seem unnecessary. 38 The Covenant should be sup-
ported, not as an absolute standard, but as the minimum acceptable
to the community of nations at the moment and subject to improve-
ment when the standards of the less advanced nations are brought
up to that level.
There has also been worry lest the international protection of
human rights may impose higher standards than those required
by the United States Constitution, or those actually observed in
some of the states of the union. Undoubtedly the United States
could properly be criticized diplomatically or in the United Nations
if individuals were denied in this country rights guaranteed to
everyone by a Covenant of Human Rights ratified by the United
States. The United States government has not hesitated to protest
in the United Nations against failure of Bulgaria, Hungary and
Rumania to observe the human rights provisions in the treaties of
peace with those countries and to join in asking an opinion of the
International Court of Justice concerning the obligation of those
countries under the procedural provisions of those treaties. 39 It is
through such processes that increasing respect for human rights
may be promoted.
There seems to be some concern, however, that the courts in
the United States have shown a disposition to apply the Charter
provisions concerning human rights and interpretations given to
them by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights approved by
the General Assembly to nullify state legislation deemed to deny
those rights. Article 56 of the Charter seems to pledge the United
37
Ibid., pp. 76ff, 86ff.
38 See below, note 44.
39 International Court of Justice, Reports, 1950, pp. 65ff, 221ff; Ameri-
can Journal of International Law, January, 1950, vol. 44, pp. 742ff and
Comments by Manley O. Hudson, January, 1951, vol. 45, pp. 4ff.
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States and other members of the United Nations to observe human
rights without racial discrimination. The Court of Appeals of
California in the Fujii Case held in 1950 that the California Alien
Land Law, which in effect, forbade Japanese to acquire land in
that state, violated the Charter and was, therefore, null and void
because of the Constitutional principle declaring treaties the
supreme law of the land. It has been suggested that Article 56 of
the Charter, though a treaty provision, is of a political character
and not judicially enforceable. There is a constitutional issue in
drawing the line between self-executing and nonself-executing
treaty provisions, but the courts have considered treaty provisions
defining individual rights to be in the former class.40 If the United
States is to participate effectively in international legislation espe-
cially on subjects such as the protection of human rights, normally
within the power of the states, the supremacy of treaties over state
law should be maintained.
International Crime and the Constitution
Alarm has also been expressed concerning the Genocide Con-
vention approved by the General Assembly in 1948 and now in
force among many states but not yet ratified by the United States.
It seems to be feared that the crime of genocide which the parties
commit themselves to punish might apply to Americans guilty of
lynching, that it might subject Americans to the jurisdiction of an
international tribunal and that the United States might be obliged
to use armed force to compel observance of the convention by other
states. These fears are, to say the least, premature. 41 Like all
treaties dealing with criminal matters, under the American Con-
stitution, the Genocide Convention, when ratified could not be
applied by federal courts until Congress had interpreted it and
given the courts jurisdiction over the offenses it describes. It has
long been held that federal criminal jurisdiction is statutory and
40
Fujii v. California, 1950, 217 Pac. 2nd 481; 218 Pac. 2nd 595;
Manley O. Hudson, American Journal of International Law, July, 1950,
vol. 44, pp. 545ff; Quincy Wright, "National Courts and Human Rights,
The Fujii Case," ibid., January, 1951, vol. 45, pp. 62ff.
41 American Bar Association, cit., note 30, pp. 51ff; Hearings, Subcom-
mittee, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, The Genocide Convention,
81st Cong., 2nd Sess., January-February, 1950, pp. 155-255. In refutation
see Adrian Fisher, Legal Adviser to Department of State, ibid., pp. 256ff;
Resolution of the Association of the Bar of New York, March 8, 1949, and
Myres S. McDougal and Richard Arens, "The Genocide Convention and
the Constitution," Vanderbilt Law Review, June, 1950, vol. 3, pp. 683ff.
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consequently that treaty provisions in this field are not self ex-
ecuting. 42 No international tribunal exists with jurisdiction over
the crime of genocide. The convention, while suggesting the possi-
bility of such a court, does not establish it. Consequently until a new
agreement establishing such a court has been negotiated speculation
about its jurisdiction is premature.
If the Genocide Convention is ratified, Congress should, of
course, give appropriate courts jurisdiction to punish the offense
as intended by the convention but it could properly insert clarifying
restrictions which would prevent unintended extensions which
might be deduced from an unduly liberal construction of the terms
of the treaty. It is clearly the purpose of the convention to assure
that the crime of genocide shall be punished wherever committed.
It may be that an international court to deal with cases not prose-
cuted in any national court will be found to contribute to this end
and the convention foresees this possibility. The convention also
opens the way to diplomatic protest or action in the United Nations
to assure observance of obligations undertaken by the convention.
It does not, however, require the United States or any other state
to engage in military or other intervention to compel observance by
other parties. Only if toleration or encouragement of genocide in a
state reached such magnitude as to threaten international peace
and security, and appropriate action by the United Nations had
recognized that threat, might a situation calling for the use of
armed forces by the United States arise.
Freedom of Trade and Information
The pending conventions to establish an International Trade
Organization and to increase freedom of information across na-
tional boundaries have also been subjects of concern, the first
mainly on the ground that it may give too much freedom of trade
and the latter mainly on the ground that it may not give enough
freedom of information.
As has been pointed out ratification of a convention concerning
transnational communication could not legally reduce American
constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and press in this
country. 43 Whether compromises with the desire of many govern-
42 Ex parte Bollman, 1807, 4 Cranch 75; U.S. v. Hudson, 1812, 7
Cranch 32; U.S. v. Coolidge, 1816, 1 Wheat., 415; Quincy Wright, Control
of American Foreign Relations, pp. 196ff.
43 Supra, notes 35, 36, 37.
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ments to control such communications have to be so serious as to
render the convention worthless is a political question.44 Half a
loaf may be better than none particularly in view of the fact that
customary international law recognizes an almost absolute right
of states to censor or prohibit both outgoing and incoming infor-
mation and propaganda. 45
Ratification of the ITO Convention and the functioning of
the organization it would set up might contribute to removing
barriers to international trade and might therefore interfere with
extreme American protectionism. That is its objective, as it is the
objective of the United States expressed in the Reciprocal Trade
Agreements policy accepted and applied by Congress since 1934
and affirmed in the Atlantic Charter, the Lend Lease Agreements,
and other policy declarations made since.46 If the United States
is to live peacefully and prosperously in a world in which it is the
greatest creditor, produces nearly half of the world's goods, and
maintains its people at a standard of living which now varies from
twice to fifty times that of other peoples, 47 it must contribute to
general expansion of trade and a greater equalization of living
standards. It cannot permanently profit from its foreign credits
unless it imports more than it exports in normal commercial
transactions. It cannot contribute to the equalization of living
standards unless the government supports large-scale programs
extending technical aid and capital to assist in the economic
development of underdeveloped areas.48
44 See Carroll Binder, "United States Representative on United Nations
Committee on Freedom of Information," January, 1951, Department of
State Bulletin, January 29 and February 5, 1951, vol. 24, pp. 194, 232.
45 Supra, note 21.
46 Clair Wilcox and Herbert Feis, in A Foreign Policy for the United
States, Quincy Wright, ed., Chicago, 1947, pp. 257ff; Harold H. Hutchin,
"The United States and World Trade," Foreign Policy Reports, January 1,
1950, vol. 25, no. 16; Quincy Wright, "International Law and Commercial
Relations," Proceedings of American Society of International Law, 1941,
pp. 30ff.
47 See United Nations Report on national and per capita incomes of
Seventy Countries, 1949, giving figures of $1450 per capita for the United
States, $870 for Canada, $849 for Switzerland, $773 for the United King-
dom, $482 for France, $346 for Argentina, $320 for Western Germany,
$308 for U.S.S.R., $300 for Poland, $102 for Brazil, $100 for Egypt, $57
for India, $27 for China and $25 for Indonesia. United Nations Bulletin,
December 15, 1950, vol. 9, p. 720. The General Assembly on November 20,
1950 adopted a resolution calling for statistics on the volume and distribu-
tion of national incomes of underdeveloped countries. Ibid., December 1,
1950, vol. 9, p. 610.
43 Willard L. Thorp, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs,
"Basic Policy in Economic Development," Department of State Bulletin,
January 15, 1951, vol. 24, pp. 94ff.
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The Use of Armed Forces and the Constitution
More vigorously expressed in Congress has been the fear that
the obligations of the Charter and the North Atlantic Pact might
permit the President to use American forces in Europe or elsewhere
without specific Congressional authority. This, indeed, was done
in the case of the Korean operation. The issue is an old one and
presidents since Washington have assumed that the Commander-in-
Chief is responsible for carrying out obligations of treaties and for
protecting American citizens abroad as well as American territory
and is, therefore, permitted, even obliged, to use the forces which
Congress provides for those purposes. This position is not only
sanctioned by practice but has been amply supported by the
Courts. 49 The question of whether the President should wish to
have Congress share responsibility for large scale movement of
forces such as maintaining several divisions in Europe for a long
time, is a political, not a legal question. 50
It is clear, however, that the certainty and speed of military
cooperation, essential if the system of collective security established
by the United Nations Charter and the North Atlantic Pact is to
work, cannot be realized unless the President has broad discretion
in the use of force to fulfill the obligations of these treaties.
Congress only can provide the budget and may thus limit the size
of forces available and the magnitude of operations, but the Presi-
dent must be able to use the forces which Congress has provided
promptly and automatically when the occasion arises. Congres-
sional debate on the expediency of fulfilling the obligation in a
particular emergency would destroy the preventive effect of col-
lective security arrangements and encourage aggression. 51
"Martin v. Mott, 12 Wheat., 19; The Prize Cases, 2 Black 635, 638;
In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1; Hearings before Committee on Armed Services,
U.S. Senate, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess., on Senate Concurrent Resolution 8,
February, 1950, especially statement by Secretary of State Acheson, pp. 88ff.
Background Information on the use of United States armed forces in
Foreign Countries, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess., House Report 127, February 20,
1951; Quincy Wright, "Constitutional Procedures in the United States for
Carrying Out Obligations of Military Sanctions," American Journal of
International Law, October, 1944, vol. 33, pp. 678ff ; Control of American
Foreign Relations, New York, 1922, pp. 1, 92-4, 293-310.
50 The Senate approved a resolution on April 4, 1951 approving the
sending of four divisions to Europe and hoping that the President would
obtain its consent before sending more. This was not a resolution of legal
effect and did not deny the legal right of the President to act independently.
See Hearings (above note 49) especially statements by ex-president Hoover
(p. 729), Secretary Acheson (pp. 96ff), Senator Taft (p. 606), Senator
Paul Douglas (p. 814), and speech of latter in Senate, July 5, 1950.
51 See Hearings (above note 49), especially remarks by General Eisen-
hower (pp. 5ff, llff), Secretary Acheson (pp. 82ff), and General Bradley
(pp. 128ff).
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International Commitments and the Constitution
Fears have been expressed that the representatives of the United
States in the United Nations and in the Specialized Agencies, may,
without Senate or Congressional support, commit the United States
in resolutions or agreements. Such commitments by executive
authority are supported by ample practice and precedent. 52 Again
the problem of when Congress should be consulted is political.
Effective American participation in international organization has
a tendency to enlarge the practical influence of informal executive
agreements in comparison with formal treaties, and thereby to
augment the relative position of the President in the United States
government. 53
These issues are symptomatic of the larger issue already en-
visaged by some advocates of world federation: Are the quali-
fications of national sovereignty essential to a world organiza-
tion able to maintain peace and law possible for the United States
without radical constitutional amendment? 54 It has perhaps not
been sufficiently stressed that this issue, like those I have discussed,
is primarily one of opinion and politics rather than of law. To this
point, President Lincoln addressed himself:
Public sentiment is everything. With public sentiment nothing can fail;
without it nothing can succeed. Consequently, he who molds public senti-
ment goes deeper than he who enacts statutes or pronounces decisions.
He makes statutes and decisions possible or impossible to be executed. 55
Neither the text of the Constitution, practice under it, nor
judicial interpretation presents serious obstacles to the United States
assuming obligations by treaty which modify the exercise of
sovereignty or even sovereignty itself, provided that the treaty deals
with a topic of international importance and that guaranteed
rights of individuals and the procedures of constitutional action are
not impaired. 56 The President externally and the Courts internally
52 U.S. v. Belmont,' 1937, 301 U.S. 324; U.S. v. Pink, 1942, 315 U.S.
203 ; Quincy Wright, "The United States and International Agreements,"
American Journal of International Law, July, 1944, vol. 38, pp. 341ff;
Control of American Foreign Relations, pp. 234-248.
53 This was one reason for the Senate's reservations on, and eventual
rejection of, the League of Nations Covenant in 1920. See Quincy Wright,
Columbia Law Review, February, 1920, vol. 20, pp. 124ft".
54 Common Cause, June, 1948, vol. 2, pp. 40 Iff.
55 Quoted by J. W. Dafore in Public Opinion and World Politics, Quincy
Wright, ed., Chicago, 1933, p. 3.
56 Geofroy v. Riggs, 1890, 133 U.S. 258; Missouri v. Holland, 1920,
252 U.S. 416; Quincy Wright, Control of American Foreign Relations, pp.
76ff, 124.
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have power to implement such obligations insofar as the Congress
has provided the President with funds and weapons, and the Courts
with jurisdiction. 57 Even the problem of appeal from national
courts to an international tribunal or the problem of the function-
ing of agencies of the United Nations with power to deal with
individuals within the territory of the United States could be solved,
within the orbit of existing precedents, by appropriate treaties. 58
Constitutional obstacles can, however, spring up like mushrooms
if public sentiment opposes the action proposed. This is not to say
that careful thought should not be given to gearing American legal
and administrative institutions into the requirements of good
membership in the United Nations. There is a technical task to be
accomplished, but if public opinion approves, it can be accom-
plished without constitutional amendment. The proposal of an
amendment might, it is true, be a useful method for ascertaining
public opinion and perhaps for stimulating public approval of
such modifications of national sovereignty, as may be essential if
we are to have a law-governed world.59
Conclusion
We live in a critical age and will continue to do so. World
government is premature and isolation is obsolete. Neither will
solve our problems. We are in a small world, from which we cannot
escape, and it contains shipmates such as Stalin and Mao with a
capacity to scuttle it. We cannot progress toward a greater security
for our way of life unless we accept this world as it is, seek to live
and let live, encourage others to do likewise in its narrowing con-
fines, and cooperate with all in trying to improve it.
If the public understands these fundamentals, the government
can do much to lessen tensions by skillful negotiation. While we
would prefer to negotiate from superior strength, so would our
opponents, and if negotiations are delayed until each has superior
strength to the other, the arms race will continue and tensions will
rise above the danger point. If the object of negotiation is not
victory, but accommodation, and if the influence of time on relative
power positions is uncertain, the reason for delaying negotiation
is not obvious.
57 Missouri v. Holland, cit., Quincy Wright, Control of American
Foreign Relations, pp. 57, 87.
5S
Ibid., pp. 110-118, 312ff, 334.
59 Supra, note 53.
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If diplomacy can initiate the easing of tensions, the United
Nations may do much to stabilize the balance of power by strength-
ening its machinery and developing a more favorable world opinion
supporting its operations. As the power of the United Nations in-
creases, it can contribute to stabilizing the equilibrium and creating
conditions favorable to the application of law. The law of the
charter then may become more reliable, and men and nations may
live in increasing confidence that the date for realization of danger-
ous ambitions has been postponed and that aggression is not likely
in the near future. 60 In such an atmosphere the American democ-
racy will need neither to commit suicide by becoming a garrison
state nor to die heroically defending itself from the attacks of its
enemies.
We cannot be sure that the world can be made safe for de-
mocracy, but we are certain it cannot be unless the democracies see
it steadily, see it accurately, and see it whole.
60 Quincy Wright, "Law and International Relations," Proceedings of
the American Philosophical Society, 1951, vol. 95, pp. 490ff.
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By George B. Galloway Senior Specialist in
American Government,
Library of Congress
Political scientists are interested in Congress because it is a
central political institution of our country which we are seeking
to strengthen in a perilous world. At a time when representative
government is on the defensive both at home and abroad, there
are few things more important than an inquiry into the organiza-
tion and operation of our national legislature and methods of im-
proving its efficiency. Congress is the keystone in the arch of our
form of government. Upon the effective performance of its consti-
tutional functions may well depend the survival in America of
democracy itself.
Twenty-five years ago a practical politician and scholar in
Congress by the name of Robert Luce remarked in one of his
Godkin Lectures at Harvard that "the old methods of representa-
tive government are nowhere equal to the problems springing from
the complexities of modern life." 1 In November, 1951, Senator
Kenneth Wherry, Republican floor leader, in his last public state-
ment before his death, referred to the major reforms adopted in
1946 and said:
But Congress still labors under antiquated machinery and processes.
This is more than a problem for Congress. It deeply affects the
liberties and welfare of every individual in the country. The creak-
ing machinery of Congress is so appallingly inadequate for modern
times that free representative government itself is endangered.
2
Despite the devoted and conscientious work of many of its
members and the gains achieved by the Legislative Reorganization
Act of 1946, the performance of Congress in recent years has at
times been a cause of anxiety to students of representative govern-
ment. Press and public opinion abound with expressions of dismay
at the various actions and inactions of our national legislature as
* Delivered April 3, 1952.
1 Robert Luce, Congress: An Explanation (1926), p. 152.
2 Excerpt from a statement by Senator Wherry reviewing the first
session of the 82nd Congress, Congressional Record, November 9, 1951, pp.
A7187-7196.
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well as some of its committees and members. 3 Under these circum-
stances, it is timely for us to consider current criticisms and pro-
posed remedies. Because of my position in the Library of Congress,
I do not wish to appear as a critic or protagonist of particular
changes, but merely as a reporter of some of the more significant
issues and suggestions.
Gains Achieved in 1946
Many people will remember the gains achieved by the
Reform Act of 1946. That act streamlined and simplified the
congressional committee structure. It went far toward clarifying
committee duties and jurisdictions. It sought to regularize and
publicize committee procedures. It stimulated striking gains in
legislative staff aids. It reduced the private-bill work-load on
Congress and strengthened oversight of administration. It tried to
reinforce the power of the purse and to turn the spotlight of pub-
licity on lobbying activities. And it made congressional service con-
siderably more attractive by raising congressional salaries and
providing pensions for retirement. Passage of these reforms was
hailed at the time as a "legislative miracle." They added up to the
most sweeping changes in the machinery and facilities of Congress
ever adopted in a single package.
But, in the opinion of some observers, much remains to be
done to improve congressional operations. The La Follette-Mon-
roney Committee which fathered the reforms of 1946 was limited
by its terms of reference in the recommendations it made. Several
provisions of the bill the committee reported were eliminated in
transit. In addition, the operation of the act over the past sbj years
has revealed certain respects in which performance has fallen short
of intent. 4 Meanwhile, political scientists tell us that Congress is
"at the crossroads" and still "on trial." Plans for "strengthening
the Congress" and making it a "twentieth century body" are put
forth by civic groups and members of Congress itself. The job is
8 See E. E. Schattschneider, "Congress in Conflict," Yale Review,
Winter 1951; "Has Congress Broken Down?" Fortune, February, 1952;
Robert Bendiner, "Just How Bad Is Congress?" Commentary, February,
1952; "Can an 18th Century Congress Do a 20th Century Job?" Washing-
ton Evening Star, February 17, 1952, p. C-l.
4
Cf. George B. Galloway, "The Operation of the Legislative Reor-
ganization Act of 1946," American Political Science Review, March, 1951,
pp. 41-68.
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not yet finished and probably never will be; but the stakes are high
and we must treat suggestions sincerely made with respect.
The Role of Congress
Proposed reforms in the performance of Congress gain per-
spective when they are viewed in the context of its prescribed role.
The organization and management of an institution are functions
of its purpose, its ultimate goal. The role of Congress in the Ameri-
can system is prescribed by Constitution, law, custom, and public
expectations. Its success as an institution depends in large part upon
how well it performs its role.
Political scientists have defined the role of Congress in vari-
ous ways. 5 Most of us would agree that its basic tasks are threefold:
1. To determine broad national policies, i.e. what missions
the government will undertake and to what agencies they
will be assigned.
2. To create an administrative structure adequate to ad-
minister the assigned jobs and to furnish the necessary
finances.
3. To review the effectiveness of administrative performance
and to modify the policy or organization when necessary.
These are the main (though not the only) tasks of Congress today,
and proposals for reform should be appraised in the light of these
major legislative responsibilities.
In performing these functions, existing arrangements, prac-
tices, and relationships present some perplexing problems. The task
of policy determination involves problems of committee coordina-
tion and control, the integration of leadership, party responsibility,
the influence of interest groups, and localized representation. The
task of providing funds and an adequate administrative structure
gives rise to the recurring problems of executive reorganization and
effective fiscal control. Responsibility for review of administrative
performance raises questions about intervention in the internal
affairs of the departments, the procedures of investigating commit-
tees, liaison with the Executive Branch, and the good of the public
5 See, for example, Ernest S. Griffith, Congress: Its Contemporary
Role (1951) for a provocative analysis. See also Charles S. Hyneman,
Bureaucracy in a Democracy (1950), Part II; and E. E. Schattschneider,
"Congress in Conflict," Yale Review, Winter 1952, pp. 181-193.
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Within the limits of a single paper it is obviously impossible
to offer a full and systematic analysis of these and other relevant
problems. However, it is possible to outline some of these problems
for your reflection and to indicate some next steps that have been
suggested to improve the performance by Congress of its main job.
POLICY DETERMINATION
Legislative policy-making is a composite of many forces. Indi-
vidual Senators and Representatives play an important role in
initiating legislation. Names like Wagner in the field of collective
bargaining, Black in the regulation of wages and hours, and Van-
denberg in foreign policy loom large in the annals of Congress.
Interest groups have exercised great influence in the tariff and price
control fields. Presidential leadership has been pervasive in national
defense, banking, and business regulation. Executive officials at
lower echelons have played a significant part. Political parties have
had more or less effect on policy determination over the years
through their platforms, caucus decisions, and their steering and
policy committees. And the structure, procedures, and rules of
Congress have also played a significant part in the complex
parentage of legislative programs.
After tracing the ancestry of 90 major statutes of the past half
century in order to discover their origins, Lawrence Chamberlain
was impressed with the "joint character of the American legislative
process," the deep roots of most important laws, the important
influence of Congress in the formulation of much major legislation,
and the unique place held by individual legislators in the history
of notable enactments. 6
From Arthur F. Bentley's pioneering work in 1908, down
through the studies of Beard, Herring, Odegard, Blaisdell, Schatt-
schneider, Key, and others, to the admirable recent systematic
volume by David B.. Truman, political scientists have illuminated
the relationships of interest groups to the governmental process. We
are especially indebted to Professor Truman for the generalizations
he has drawn from the monographic literature of the past concern-
ing the dynamics of access and the techniques of interest groups
in the legislative process. 7
6 Lawrence H. Chamberlain, The President, Congress and Legislation
(1946), Chapter XII.
7 David B. Truman, The Governmental Process (1951), Chapters XI
and XII.
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After an intensive study of the background of the Employ-
ment Act of 1946, Stephen K. Bailey concluded that the process
of legislative policy-making is almost unbelievably complex. It
"appears to be the result," he writes, "of a confluence of factors
streaming from an almost endless number of tributaries: national
experience, the contributions of social theorists, the clash of power-
ful economic interests, the quality of Presidential leadership, other
institutional and personal ambitions, and administrative arrange-
ments in the Executive Branch; the initiative, effort, and ambitions
of individual legislators and their governmental and non-govern-
mental staffs; the policy commitments of political parties; and the
predominant culture symbols in the minds of both leaders and
followers in the Congress. . . ." 8
Committees of Congress
Subject to some limitations, the committees of Congress have
come to play a dominant role in policy-making. Each composed
of comparatively few members, each normally acting independently
of the others, they now determine the agenda of both houses which
have almost entirely surrendered to their standing committees the
power to decide what matters shall be considered on the floor and
to control the proceedings there, subject to the terms of the House
Rules Committee. Except in extreme instances, they can report
bills or pigeonhole them and they can initiate measures they desire
and bury or emasculate those they dislike. They can proceed with
dispatch or deliberate at length. The real locus of the legislative
power is not in the House or Senate as such; it is in their standing
committees. Students of the legislative process recognize that "the
tendency ... is for the standing committees to set policy that the
whole legislature usually follows." 9 The final judgment of the com-
mittees is apt to be accepted by the chambers, except perhaps on
deeply controversial issues like statehood for Alaska and universal
military training where committees this year have suffered the
set-back of recommittal. Much of the influence of a committee
depends upon the confidence Congress has in the need for the
intensive and specialized consideration which only a committee can
give a measure. 10
8 Stephen K. Bailey, Congress Makes a Law (1950), p. 236.
9 David B. Truman, op. cit., p. 370.
10 Cf. Mary Follett, The Speaker of the House of Representatives
(1896), p. 246.
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Just as the standing committees usually control legislative
action, so the chairmen are usually masters of their committees. As
one who has been privileged to observe congressional committee
hearings and executive sessions at first hand during the past decade,
I can testify to the powers of committee chairmen. Selected on the
basis of seniority, locally elected and locally responsible, the chair-
men hold key positions in the power structure of Congress. The
usual state of affairs is as follows: They arrange the agenda of the
committees, appoint the subcommittees, and refer bills to them.
They often decide what pending measures shall be considered and
when, call committee meetings, and decide whether or not and
when to hold hearings. They approve lists of scheduled witnesses,
select their staffs and authorize staff studies, and preside at com-
mittee hearings. They handle reported bills on the floor, and
participate as principal managers in conference committees. Com-
mittee chairmen are in a position to expedite measures they favor
and retard or pigeonhole those they dislike. Strong chairmen can
often induce the kind of committee actions in executive sessions
which they desire. In the House of Representatives, where debate is
limited, the chairman in charge of a bill apportions his time to
whomever he pleases during debate on the floor. He also has the
right to open and close the debate on bills reported by his com-
mittee and he may move the previous question whenever he thinks
best. In short, committee chairmen exercise crucial powers over the
legislative process. 11 In his little classic on Congressional Govern-
ment, written 67 years ago, Woodrow Wilson described our form of
government in a single phrase by calling it "a government by the
chairmen of the standing committees of Congress." 12 So far as
Congress is concerned, this description is, in a large sense, still true.
Wilson went on to describe these committee chairmen as
constituting a "disintegrate ministry" composed of the "elders of
the assembly" who were the "dissociated heads of forty-eight 'little
legislatures' ". Intercommittee coordination is still a basic problem
of the Congress. With few exceptions, there is little or no coordina-
tion among the standing committees today. Policy-making is
11
It is unusual for a committee to overrule its chairman, as the Com-
mittee on Foreign Relations did in March, 1952, in holding hearings on the
St. Lawrence Seaway bill.
12 Woodrow Wilson, Congressional Government (1885), p. 102.
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splintered among 180 committees of various kinds. 13 As Peter
Odegard points out, "the greater the specialization and the nar-
rower the field of inquiry, the greater becomes the need for
coordination and integration at higher levels and over broader
areas."
14
The basic problem remaining in the reorganization of Con-
gress, in short, is the integration of Congress itself so that its
autonomous and scattered units will act in harmony. Increased
efficiency in the legislative branch of the government depends in
large part upon more effective meshing of the legislative gears. One
of the great needs of a more efficient and responsible legislature is to
unify its command and coordinate its parts. At present, Congress
functions not as a unified institution, but as a collection of auton-
omous committees or "little legislatures" which seldom act in
concert. The House and Senate have as many standing committees
as there are broad fields of legislation. Each committee goes its own
way independently of the others. There is little or no coordination
of their activities, their membership, or their legislative proposals.
A system of autonomous committees militates against the develop-
ment of centralized legislative leadership as well as the adoption
of a coherent legislative program.
The function of leadership is scattered among the chairmen
of 180 committees of all types: standing (34), special (5), joint
(12), and subcommittees (130). The chairmen of the committees
seldom cooperate in the development of mutually consistent meas-
ures. They do not act as a group of responsible party leaders. The
more numerous the committees, the more is leadership diffused.
There is little integration or interlocking between the vari-
ous policy or steering committees and the chairmen of the legisla-
tive committees. But the Senate policy committees during their
short life have indicated that they might become useful devices for
coordinating legislative policy-making and integrating party leader-
ship. Party caucuses or conferences are rarely held to determine
the party stand on legislative issues. And party responsibility for
policy-making is weakened by the operation of the seniority system.
Selection of committee chairmen on the basis of seniority is an
13 Considering "our disintegrate methods of legislation," it is surpris-
ing that there are not more foolish conflicts of laws or fatal inconsistencies
of principle than actually appear in our statutes.
14 Peter Odegard, "Variations on a Familiar Theme," American Po-
litical Science Review, December, 1951, pp. 968-69.
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important factor in the diffusion of leadership and the lack of an
integrated legislative program in Congress.
Policy Determination Proposals
What are the remedies suggested for these problems of co-
ordination, integration, and control? Radical constitutional reforms
such as those proposed by writers like W. Y. Elliott, Henry Hazlitt,
and Thomas K. Finletter seem impracticable at this late date in
American political history. After long reflection many political
scientists have been led to believe that the chief hope of reform as
regards policy-making lies in strengthening the machinery of party
government. Despite the difficulties involved, no other feasible
remedy for the diffuse leadership and disintegrate machinery of
Congress has been proposed than to tighten up the congressional
party organization along the lines suggested by the Committee on
Political Parties of the American Political Science Association in
its report, Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System.
The major problems of our time call for the formulation,
adoption, and execution of comprehensive and consistent national
policies. But the federal structure, the system of separated powers,
and the piece-meal practices of American government create
formidable obstacles to the making and execution of over-all plans
of action. I agree with Professor Schattschneider that the heart of
the trouble is not at bottom a matter of constitutional structure, leg-
islative procedure, or administrative organization. "The central
difficulty ... is a deficiency of the power to govern," 15 a failure to
achieve an effective organization of the majority will. A demo-
cratic solution of this problem of power is to be found in the
reconstruction of party government in the United States. The two
major political parties can be converted into appropriate instru-
ments for the intelligent planning, integration, and over-all man-
agement of public affairs. More effective party government is a
promising means for the development of public policies designed
to attain the aims and purposes of the American people.
Specifically, the following steps toward the reconstruction of
party government in Congress are suggested:
15
E. E. Schattschneider, The Struggle for Party Government (1948),
p. 3.
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1. Revive the party caucus and require party members to abide by
its decisions when arrived at by a majority vote.
2. Let each caucus elect a leadership group composed of a chair-
man, a secretary, a floor leader, and a whip who will be its
acknowledged leaders.
3. Let this leadership group choose the chairmen (or ranking
minority members) of the standing committees of the chamber
who, together with the four party officers, shall constitute the
party policy committee. The committee chairmen to be chosen
upon the basis of ability and willingness to cooperate in carry-
ing forward the party program.
4. Assign to the party policy committees the functions of (a) call-
ing frequent meetings of the party membership to discuss party
policies and operations, and to reach decisions on major issues;
(b) submitting policy proposals to the membership; (c) draw-
ing up the slates of committee assignments for approval by the
party caucus; (d) limiting the legislative agenda via priority lists
of matters of major national importance; (e) planning legis-
lative strategy with a view to the implementation of party plat-
form promises; (f) scheduling the order of business on the floor;
"and (g) coordinating committee activities and harmonizing their
actions.
5. Reconsider committee assignments every two years or so, in
order to allow the shifting of uncooperative committeemen.
6. Deprive repeatedly recalcitrant party members of their patron-
age and committee assignments.
For several decades the legislative caucus was the effective
"drilling-ground" of the parties in Congress. It served as a cor-
rective of the centrifugal forces of the committee system. Each
party had its own caucus and there were separate caucuses for the
two houses. The caucus selected the party's candidates for office
in the chamber and formulated and enforced the party's will with
respect to legislative action. Decisions reached in caucus concerning
legislative policy and program were binding upon the entire mem-
bership of the party and controlled their votes. Caucus decisions
of the majority party determined the action of the chamber itself.
Thus, the line of party responsibility ran straight from the electorate
through the majority caucus to the party leadership and member-
ship in Congress.
Woodrow Wilson extolled this type of party government in
1885. It supplied the cohesive and disciplinary force now so lacking
in legislative halls. It served "to reduce malcontents and mutineers
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into submission." Wilson said: "The silvern speech spent in caucus
secures the golden silence maintained on the floor of Congress,
making each party rich in concord and happy in cooperation." 16
It is interesting to recall that the machinery Wilson admired in
1885 attained its apex during the first years of his presidency.
Democrats in Congress listened to the eloquent voice of their leader
in the White House and enacted the greater part of his legislative
program via the caucus route in both houses. Historians have
assigned the credit for the establishment of the Federal Reserve
System, the Underwood Tariff Act, the currency and other reforms
of the New Freedom era to the effective use of the legislative
caucus in both houses of Congress. 17
Today the situation is quite different. The caucus has become
a "conference." Attempts to bind the party membership to vote for
measures designed to carry out platform pledges are rarely made.
The last time the Democrats held a binding caucus in the House
was in January, 1949, on the proposal to curb the powers of the
Rules Committee. Unless caucus decisions have binding force, the
essence of party government— holding the majority party respon-
sible for legislative action— is destroyed. If a segment of the
majority party can form a coalition with the minority party and
defeat or amend the measures of the majority party, then it has
lost responsibility for legislative action.
In view of its historic achievements and potentialities, Sen-
ator Humphrey and others have suggested that the legislative
caucus be brought back into active use by the party in power. The
caucus is but a means to an end: party government. If we believe
in party government as a desirable feature of our political system,
then we must be prepared to restore and strengthen the caucus
system as an essential feature of party government in Congress. For
the general assembly of the party is the only democratic device by
which the congressional parties may formulate their legislative
policies, and by which the majority party can execute its decisions.
Under the scheme outlined above, leadership would be
concentrated in the policy committees which could be held account-
able by the caucus and the country, committee coordination and
16 See speech of Hon. Matthew M. Neely on "Loquacity of Senatorial
Speeches" in the U. S. Senate, Congressional Record, Nov. 4, 1951, pp.
A7241-43.
11 W. F. Willoughby, Principles of Legislative Organization and Ad-
ministration (1934), p. 559.
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control could be achieved, agreement and compromises upon major
legislative policies could be hammered out, a minimum agenda of
truly important measures could be drawn up, presumably in con-
sultation with the President if he were of the same party, and the
legislative schedule could give priority to the program of the
leadership. The party would select its acknowledged leaders to
represent it; the leaders would assume the responsibility of develop-
ing a program which they believed to be practical, attainable, and
in the national interest; they would present this program to
Congress and the country and do their best to obtain its passage.
With attention thus focused on issues of importance to the state
of the Union, the level of congressional debates would be lifted,
public opinion would be enlightened, and the people would be
better able to evaluate the record of Congress. "Our political sys-
tem will not have been changed; demagoguery will not have been
eliminated; individual congressmen will still vote their convictions
or record the wishes of those who dominate their constituency.
But it will be easier to judge the party in power by its works, as
distinguished from its promises, and, perhaps, even its promises will
be more significant than formerly." 18
This prescription is based upon the assumptions that the
American people desire effective and democratic government and
that a more responsible party system will produce the kind of
government they want. If you accept the validity of these assump-
tions, then this prescription will appeal to you as practical and
worth working for. But if you agree with Austin Ranney that
Americans do not want real party government or majority rule at
the expense of the possible violation of minority rights, but that
they really prefer minority rule and are at bottom satisfied with
what he calls our present anti-majoritarian constitutional and party
systems, then this prescription will strike you as an "iridescent
dream," to borrow a phrase from Arthur Holcombe, and the
chances of congressional reform will be reduced to comparatively
insignificant changes in internal structure and procedure. 19
In supporting the Schattschneider report, the dilemmas that
"Lawrence H. Chamberlain, "Congress— Diagnosis and Prescrip-
tion," Political Science Quarterly, September, 1945, p. 445.
19 Austin Ranney, "Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System
:
A Commentary." American Political Science Review, June, 1951, pp. 488-
499. Arthur N. Holcombe, Our More Perfect Union (1950), p. 416. See
also Griffith, op. cit., chapter 12.
45
are involved in proposals for strengthening party responsibility are
realized. They have been well stated by Philip Levy in the following
terms:
1. How shall we bring special interest groups into the parties, while
subordinating their influence to each party's conception of the
national welfare?
2. How can we maintain a vigorous two-party system while cushion-
ing the divisive forces within each party?
3. How can the most creative minds in Congress be stimulated to
exert leadership at the advancing frontiers of public opinion,
while maintaining a common basis for party program, responsi-
bility, and discipline?
4. How may the influence of party organization and program in
government be increased, while avoiding their use as new levers
for pressure group activities and new opportunities for exploita-
tion by some tight little group around the party throne? 20
FISCAL CONTROL
A second main task of Congress is to create an adequate
administrative organization and to provide money for government
needs. No question of legislative procedure is involved in the first
part of this task, except the question of whether the President's
reorganization plans shall be acceptable to one or both houses,
which is not now a matter of major moment. The important ques-
tions here are these: Is the machinery of Congress designed to give
it an over-all view of fiscal policy? How can the power of the
purse, which is the constitutional birthright of Congress, be
strengthened?
Congressional Fiscal Machinery
At present the fiscal machinery of Congress suffers from a
lack of integration. Consideration of revenue and spending meas-
ures is divided by bicameralism between the Senate and the House
of Representatives. Under Constitution and custom all money bills
originate in the lower house, but the Senate reviews and Revises
them in its appellate capacity. Consideration of such measures is
further split in each chamber between its legislative committees
which report bills authorizing expenditures, its finance committee
20 In his review of the Schattschneider report in the Harvard Law
Review, Vol. 65, 1952, pp. 536-541.
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which reports revenue bills, and its appropriations committee
which reports supply bills. The committee on appropriations in
each house is in turn subdivided into nine or ten subcommittees
which consider and report the several appropriation bills.
Some over-all view of the federal fiscal picture on the supply
side is afforded by the existence of some cross-membership among
the appropriation subcommittees and by the cursory review of the
subcommittees' reports by the full committees on appropriations.
However, in the lower house, membership on its Ways and Means
Committee and its Committee on Appropriations is "exclusive" so
that there is no cross-membership between them. In the Senate
there is some cross-membership between six of its legislative com-
mittees and its Committee on Appropriations under Rule XVI,
clause 6, of the standing rules of the Senate. But at present there
is no cross-membership between the Senate Committees on Finance
and on Appropriations. However, all the members of the latter
committee serve on at least one other standing committee of the
Senate under its two-committee-assignment rule.
The Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation, whose
membership is drawn from the finance committees of the two
houses, provides some intercameral coordination on the revenue
side of the fiscal picture, largely through its staff, but there is no
joint committee on appropriations on the supply side. On the
expenditure side there is the Joint Committee on Reduction of
Nonessential Federal Expenditures, but this committee lays its
emphasis on economy in expenditure rather than fiscal policy.
In short, the fiscal machinery of Congress is splintered and
fragmented. The tax committees tend to be tax-minded, the spend-
ing committees to be expenditure-minded. The Joint Committee
on the Budget provided for by the Legislative Reorganization Act
of 1946 might have been budget-minded, but for various reasons it
has failed to function as planned and is now defunct. Under these
circumstances, it is evident that the existing fiscal machinery of
Congress is not now such as to give that body an over-all co-
ordinated view of federal fiscal policy.
Recent Steps Toward Integration
Four attempts have recently been made to overcome the
disintegration in the structure and operation of Congress. First was
the recommendation by the La Follette-Monroney Committee in its
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1946 report that both houses create majority and minority policy
committees in order "to formulate the over-all legislative policy of
the two parties" and "bring about more party accountability for
policies and pledges." 21 Majority policy committees, it was believed,
could furnish an effective mechanism for the exercise of party
leadership and a focus for party responsibility and accountability.
According to the original design, the policy committee would
undertake to coordinate the work of the several standing commit-
tees in each house and would also be an effective means for im-
proving congressional performance on fiscal matters. Composed of
the chairmen of the major committees, it was contemplated that
the committee "would be in a strategic position to determine
over-all fiscal policy and to assure that legislation coming forward
through the committees was in accordance therewith." 22
Party Policy Committees
While the leaders of the House declined to accept this
recommendation, party policy committees were subsequently created
in the Senate. In practice, however, the majority policy committee
in the Senate has not been composed of the chairmen of the stand-
ing committees (with the exception of Senators Taft, White,
Millikin, and Brooks in the 80th Congress and Senators Russell
and O'Mahoney in the 82d Congress) , and it has not undertaken to
coordinate the legislative policy-making of the standing committees.
The majority leader meets with the chairmen of the standing com-
mittees five or six times a session, primarily for the purpose of
legislative scheduling. Although there has been considerable cross-
membership between the policy and fiscal committees of the Senate,
the latter do not appear to have been active participants to date in
the field of fiscal policy. The evolution of the policy committees
into effective leadership groups has thus been handicapped.
Legislative Budget
A second attempt to achieve integration in the field of fiscal
policy was the creation by the Legislative Reorganization Act of
21 Report of the Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress,
Senate Report No. 1011, 79th Congress, 2nd Session, pp. 12-13.
"Robert Heller, Strengthening the Congress (1945), pp. 14-15.
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1946 of a Joint Budget Committee with the duty of preparing a
"legislative budget" and recommending a ceiling on appropriations.
The objective of this section, according to the La Follette-Mon-
roney Committee, was "to strengthen the position of Congress in
relation to fiscal affairs ... to coordinate appropriations with
revenues so as to fix an over-all fiscal policy for the year . . . [and]
to determine each session a definite congressional policy on fiscal
matters. . . ." 23
Section 138 of the Act directed the four finance committees
of Congress, acting jointly, to meet at the beginning of each regular
session, examine the President's estimates of prospective federal
receipts and expenditures, and prepare a "legislative budget" for
the coming fiscal year. The phrase "legislative budget" was prob-
ably a misnomer. What the authors of the Act contemplated was
not a detailed, itemized estimate of appropriations such as is pre-
sented in the Executive Budget, but rather two aggregate figures:
an over-all limit on federal expenditures for the coming fiscal year,
and an estimate of total receipts. The Joint Committee on the
Budget was further directed to report, by February 15, its recom-
mendation of the maximum amount to be appropriated for expen-
diture in the ensuing year, including a reserve for deficiencies. Their
report was to be "accompanied by a concurrent resolution adopting
such budget, and fixing the maximum amount to be appropriated
for expenditure in such year." This resolution was to have recom-
mended the reduction of the public debt to the extent of the excess
if receipts exceed expenditures, or an increase of the debt by the
excess of estimated expenditures over receipts. "It was hoped at
that time," as Chairman Clarence Cannon of the House Appro-
priations Committee remarked later, "that this provision would
solve the problem, that it would bring into such strong relief the
[prospective] outgo and income of the Federal Government as to
retrench the amount of money appropriated and bring it into a
reasonable relation with the national income."24 Economy and fiscal
balance were evidently the basic aims of the legislative budget.
In practice the legislative budget has been a failure. In 1947
the concurrent resolution passed both houses, but died in conference
because the conferees were unable to agree upon the division of an
expected surplus between tax reduction and debt retirement. In
"Ibid., pp. 18-19Ibid .
Congressional Record, May 27, 1949, p. A3491.
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1948 the resolution again passed both houses, but it proved to be
merely a formal gesture, for total appropriations in that year
exceeded the budget ceiling by several billion dollars. On the third
trial, in 1949, the joint committee asked for an extension of time,
but the deadline came and went without further action. Since
1949 the legislative budget has been ignored and now appears to
be a dead letter.
Failure of this reform has been attributed to various pro-
cedural and technical difficulties: the unwieldy size of the joint
budget committee, lack of an adequate staff, insufficient time to
prepare its report, complexities of the appropriation process, and
inability to determine a spending policy until the appropriations
committees have finished their review of the departmental esti-
mates. However, these deficiencies can perhaps be corrected. 20
Consolidation of Appropriations
A short-lived attempt at coordination in the fiscal field was
the consolidation of all the general appropriation bills in a single
package in 1950. Theretofore the supply bills had gone through the
28 stages of the legislative process in piecemeal fashion, each bill
being handled separately by different subcommittees, with little or
no consideration of their interrelationships or systematic allocation
of public revenues among governmental functions and services.
Each of the money bills had been considered individually at the
committee and floor stages. Lack of over-all control encouraged
deficiency and supplemental requests for funds, which still further
weakened congressional control. The President submitted a unified
budget to Congress, which broke it up into bits and pieces. In 1950,
however, appropriations were merged into one bill which reduced
the President's estimates by more than two billion dollars and which
was ready for his signature two full months ahead of the budget
authorization completion date in 1949. This was a tour de force.
The record of its first trial showed, as Senator Byrd pointed out,
"that enactment of the single appropriation bill this year [1950]
required less time, promoted fuller participation in debate, and re-
sulted in savings rather than increases." After one year's experiment
with the new procedure, Chairman Cannon said that "the single
2S See Mike Monroney, et al., The Strengthening of American Po-
litical Institutions (1949), p. 19.
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appropriation bill offers the most practical and efficient method
of handling the annual budget and the national fiscal program."
Despite this auspicious beginning, there were rumblings of
dissatisfaction with the new procedure in both houses. Conflicting
claims were made concerning the advantages and disadvantages of
the omnibus method and the economies that had been achieved
under it. Some members disliked the single-package approach to
federal financing because it impeded the flow of federal funds into
congressional districts for favored projects. When his committee
voted to discard the new technique and return to the old piecemeal
method, Mr. Cannon held the House Democratic leadership largely
responsible for this "backward step."
On the day of its demise Mr. Cannon attributed rejection of
the device in part to outside pressure. "Every predatory lobbyist,
every pressure group seeking to get its hands into the United States
Treasury, every bureaucrat seeking to extend his empire down-
town," he said, "is opposed to the consolidated bill." And he put
his finger on a basic dilemma of the American political system when
he warned the House that "one weakness of our form of govern-
ment is that members of Congress are political beneficiaries of
federal largess distributed in their districts and their states. The
more money we can vote out of the Treasury and into our re-
spective bailiwicks, the more votes we may expect at the next
election." 26
Detached students of the appropriation process observed that
the omnibus procedure fell short of the objectives of the legislative
budget in that it did not fix a ceiling on federal expenditures or
give a coordinated view of prospective income and outgo. But they
considered it a step in the right direction and urged its further
trial. 27
Joint Economic Committee
A fourth move toward integration of legislative policy-making
in the economic field was the creation by the Employment Act of
1946 of the Joint Committee on the Economic Report. This commit-
tee has 14 members, seven from each house, with membership from
both parties. One of its assigned functions is to study means of
26 Congressional Record, January 29, 1951, pp. 796-800, daily edition.
27 Letters from the National Committee for Strengthening Congress




coordinating programs in order to further the policy of full employ-
ment. It was contemplated that the joint economic committee
would formulate an economic policy each year which would serve
as a guide to the several congressional committees dealing with
legislation relating to the President's Economic Report. While the
committee has held hearings, made studies, and published several
valuable reports, they have been primarily interested in factual in-
vestigations of specific economic problems.
Its success as a coordinating mechanism depends upon its
acceptance by the standing committees of both houses. The joint
committee's ability to influence legislation and coordinate economic
policy is limited by its lack of authority to report bills or review
the recommendations of other congressional committees function-
ing in the economic field. Although its annual reports prior to 1950
split along strictly partisan lines, its reports and studies have
doubtless helped to influence and inform congressional opinion.
It may also have had some educative effect on other standing
committees through cross-memberships. Two of its members—
O'Mahoney and Taft— serve on their respective party policy com-
mittees ; and two others— Sparkman and Patman— are chairmen
of the select committees on small business. Its chairman, Senator
O'Mahoney, is also chairman of Interior and Insular Affairs. But
its composition is such, its relationships so tenuous, that it has not
yet achieved its full potential as a coordinating device in the field
of economic policy. "It is still a fringe committee," writes Ernest
Griffith, "feeling its way." 28
Next Steps Toward Fiscal Control
As next steps toward strengthening the power of the purse,
four proposals have attracted particular attention : ( 1 ) creation of a
Joint Committee on Fiscal Policy, (2) consolidation of the appro-
priations bills as standard practice, ( 3 ) granting power to the Presi-
dent to veto individual items in the general appropriations bills, and
(4) making the appropriations on a biennial basis.
A new Joint Committee on Fiscal Policy would be composed
of selected members of the four financial committees of Congress.
Its task would be to consider the over-all aspects of revenue and




relates revenues and expenditures, study the relative importance of
governmental functions and services, and recommend the most ap-
propriate allocation of available revenues among the main classes
of public expenditure. It would advise, but not supersede, the sepa-
rate standing committees on finance and appropriations of the
House and Senate. The joint fiscal committee would concern itself
solely with major categories of income and outgo and would express
its views on revenue and expenditure ceilings. It would deal only
with the broad aspects of the budget, leaving the detailed work of
devising suitable fiscal measures to the present committees con-
cerned with revenue and appropriations. It would be equipped with
a staff of fiscal experts who would make functional analyses of fed-
eral expenditures and aid the joint committee in formulating a cen-
tral policy for fiscal control. Such a joint committee, as the Secretary
of the Treasury told Congress some years ago, "would be a lens
through which all appropriation and revenue measures could be
viewed in relationship both to what the nation needs and to what
the nation can afford." The presentation of its report would stimu-
late a searching debate on the main outlines of fiscal policy. Con-
gress could look to this joint fiscal committee for guidance on fiscal
planning just as it should be able to look to the Joint Economic
Committee for guidance in the field of economic planning. The
obvious need of integrating fiscal and economic policy might be met
by cross-membership between the joint fiscal and economic com-
mittees or via the majority policy committees. 29
Second, it is suggested that Congress adopt the Byrd resolu-
tion (Senate Concurrent Resolution 27) to include all the general
appropriations bills in a single package. The brief experiment with
the omnibus money bill in 1950 showed that it is more expeditious
and economical than the piecemeal method. This innovation will
facilitate observance of a ceiling on expenditures, focus responsi-
bility for any increase in the public debt, and offer a method of
financial retrenchment. It will also enable Congress to act more
intelligently on budget requests and make the pruning of agency
estimates more orderly and less haphazard. Furthermore, it will
tend to offset the pleas of pressure groups, permit Congress to see
29 For a thoughtful discussion of this problem, see Clinton Fielder,
"Reform of the Congressional Legislative Budget," National Tax Journal,
March, 1951, pp. 65-76. See also, George B. Galloway, Reform of the
Federal Budget (1950), pp. 110-115.
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the budget picture as a whole, and reduce the number of deficiency
and supplemental appropriations bills.
A third suggestion is that Congress, as an exercise of its rule-
making power, might well grant the President power to veto items
contained in appropriations bills, subject to their reconsideration
and approval by a two-thirds vote of both houses. Appropriations
bills at times contain items objectionable to the President, and ex-
traneous "riders" are also attached to them, despite parliamentary
rules to the contrary. Under present conditions the President has
little discretion with respect to such items and riders since, if he
vetoes a bill because of them, he may paralyze the administration
through lack of funds. He must accept or reject an appropriation
bill in its entirety, it being generally believed that he cannot veto
specific items, although he may decline to spend appropriated
money.
The desirability of a constitutional amendment or of legisla-
tion to give this item veto power to the President has been fre-
quently suggested. In its report on budgeting and accounting the
Hoover Commission recommended "that the President should have
authority to reduce expenditures under appropriations, if the pur-
poses intended by the Congress are still carried out." The same
suggestion was recently made by the Senate Committee on Rules
and Administration in a report recommending the consolidation of
the general supply bills. Fears had been expressed that the big
money bill might become a ready vehicle for legislative riders unless
the President were granted some form of veto power over items and
legislative provisions in appropriations bills. The consolidated bill
procedure would place him in a more difficult position in this re-
spect than he has been heretofore.
Such a grant of power would be no innovation in the
American political system. Congress has already approved the
principle in authorizing the chief executive of the Philippine Islands
and Puerto Rico to veto items in appropriations bills, and about
three-fourths of the states have given similar power to their gover-
nors. Some states empower the governor to reduce as well as to veto
items. In a majority of states the legislatures may override the
executive veto of appropriation items only by a two-thirds ma-
jority vote.30
30 See my testimony at the hearings before the House Committee on
Expenditures in the Executive Departments on the Budgetary Practices Re-
organization Act of 1950 (H.R. 8054), July 18, 1950, pp. 59-61.
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A fourth suggestion is to place the federal budget on a bi-
ennial basis. From the congressional viewpoint, biennial appropria-
tions would simplify the appropriation process, reduce the heavy
work load on the appropriations committees, allow time for a more
careful scrutiny of departmental estimates, and facilitate passage
of the supply bills before July 1st. Enactment of the regular money
bills in the first session would enable Congress to concentrate during
the second session upon other important legislative measures. Under
a system of biennial appropriations the appropriations committee
could stagger the regular supply bills, handling those for one group
of agencies one year and another group the next year. By staggering
the supply bills in alternate years, the subcommittees could under-
take a more thorough review of the budget estimates.
A selective classification of governmental activities might be
made in terms of stable vs. emergency functions. The stable category
would include, for example, the continuing regulatory and research
activities of the government, while the emergency category would
include such fluctuating activities as price control, national defense,
etc. Then appropriations could be made biennially or for even
longer periods to agencies in the first category, while those in the
second category would remain on an annual basis.
From the administrative viewpoint, biennial appropriations
would save much time and money in departmental budget offices in
the preparation of the budget estimates. They would enable admin-
istrative officials to plan their operations further ahead, instead of
being on tenterhooks most of the time as to their financial resources.
This would improve the morale of the entire civil service which is
now demoralized by the recurring failure to enact the regular
money bills before the beginning of the fiscal year. Under the
present system «f provisional financing, bureaus find it difficult in
July and August to forecast their future fiscal requirements when
their appropriations for the current fiscal year have not yet been
approved. Moreover, biennial appropriations would make for a
more efficient and flexible administration of government programs,
provided equal quarterly apportionment of funds was not required.
They might also take the problem of agency financing out of the
realm of politics for a longer period and so help to stabilize ad-
ministration and give assurance of continuing programs of public
service. Forty-one states have found biennial budgets both practi-
cable and desirable. Thirty-eight state legislatures hold biennial
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sessions. Bills to effect this change have recently been introduced
in the House of Representatives.
In addition to these four basic steps, several subsidiary pro-
cedural reforms might well be adopted. Joint hearings of the paral-
lel subcommittees on the same money bills would expedite the
legislative phase of the budget process. If the Senate subcommittees
were exclusive in their membership as the House subcommittees are,
their members could concentrate on a single appropriation bill or
title. Cost estimates in authorizing committee reports would provide
valuable information on spending projects. Record votes on appro-
priations bills would make legislators more spending-conscious, let
their constituents know how they voted, and improve floor attend-
ance. And more adequate staff aids would enable the subcommittees
to scrutinize the estimates more closely. Congressmen frequently
complain that they must appropriate blindly under the present
arrangements.
ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW
Review of administrative performance is a third great func-
tion of Congress today. Political theory and practice have assigned
this oversight task to the elected representatives of the people for
more than 250 years. Section 136 of the Legislative Reorganization
Act made it explicit by directing the standing committees of Con-
gress to exercise "continuous watchfulness" of the execution of the
laws by the administrative agencies under their jurisdiction. Con-
gress has a stake in the conduct of administration because of the
multiple contacts of government officials with the citizenry, and
because administrative discretion in law enforcement will help
determine the shape of the future American economy and society.
Congress exercises more or less control over four principal
areas of administration: the appointment and removal of adminis-
trative personnel, the performance of delegated powers, the ex-
penditure of public funds, and the conduct of foreign relations. And
its oversight kit contains a variety of tools including refusal to con-
firm nominees, senatorial courtesy, review of the estimates, audit
reports, question periods at the committee stage, special investiga-
tions, the legislative veto procedure, time limits upon the exercise
of delegated powers, and field inspection trips.
Congress also maintains day-to-day supervision over the
various administrative establishments. Individual legislators tell ad-
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ministrators what the congressional intent was in passing a law;
they tell them what the American people expect in the way of
governmental service; and they appear before administrative
agencies as special agents for their constituents. Creation in recent
years of several "watchdog committees" in such fields as atomic
energy, foreign aid, federal expenditures, and defense production
and preparedness has focused attention on this oversight function.
While the review of administrative conduct is a proper legis-
lative function, the manner of its exercise in some instances has
given rise to criticism and to suggestions for improvement in the
forms of congressional supervision. Critics question whether con-
gressional control can be exercised efficiently and responsibly,
whether supervision by the standing committees promotes good
government, whether Congress is well equipped to inspect the de-
tails of administration, and whether hostile, partisan investigations
are good for the public service. Alleged abuse of the immunity
privilege by attacks upon the loyalty and integrity of public officials
is said to undermine their morale as well as popular confidence in
the government.
PROPOSED REFORMS
Intervention in administration by the individual legislator
seeking special treatment for his constituents "must be viewed with
suspicion if not positive distrust," says Professor C. S. Hyneman.
Official review of administrative action should be entrusted, he
thinks, to committees rather than individual members. It was the
intention of the authors of the Legislative Reorganization Act that
the supervisory committees would serve as a "clearing house" to
which Congressmen would refer constituent complaints and in-
quiries and which would then bring them to the attention of the
agencies concerned. This method, as the Hoover Commission Task
Force on Regulatory Commissions remarked, "would shield both
the Congressman and the commission from the suspicion of influ-
ence inherent in direct approaches for constituents." Hyneman sug-
gests three remedies for legislative dissatisfaction with administrative
acts : first, clarification of congressional intent by joint or concurrent
resolution; second, incorporation of administrative policy into the
statutes ; and, third, submission to Congress of crucial administrative
decisions made under delegated authority for its approval or disap-
proval, like the provisional order system in Great Britain. He sug-
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gests that the situation would be greatly improved if Congress would
clarify the responsibility of its committees for advising administra-
tive officials.31
In a lucid analysis of the oversight problem, the Committee
on Administrative Law of the Bar Association of New York City
states that "vigilant and conscientious exercise of proper oversight
and consultation are much to be desired and encouraged." The
problem is one of achieving a "suitable accommodation of popular
control and flexible administrative expertness." Certain limits might
well be self-imposed. Legislative committees ought not to try to
influence the decisions of pending cases, issues before an agency, or
the manner in which a particular case is being handled— "a
precept not universally respected in practice." Nor should decided
cases be criticized with a view to influencing an agency to reverse
a previous ruling or to limit a trend in agency decisions, except
when a committee is genuinely considering amending the statute.
However, the bar association committee considers it proper for a
committee of Congress to make suggestions to an agency with re-
spect to its procedures or internal organization and to comment
upon proposed substantive rules. 32
Alleged abuses of the investigative function of Congress by a
few committees have given rise to numerous proposals for reform
in the scope and conduct of congressional investigations. Certain
fact-finding inquiries might well be delegated to ad hoc bodies out-
side of Congress like the Hoover Commission. The flood of con-
gressional investigations which swept Capitol Hill last year made
heavy inroads upon the limited time and legislative duties of mem-
bers. There is need, perhaps, of greater self-restraint and more
discriminating selectivity in surveillance in order to conserve the
energies of legislators and to avoid impairing the morale and
efficiency of the civil service. Moreover, a general code of fair con-
duct for all investigating committees might be adopted by the
House and Senate as part of their standing rules, in order to safe-
guard the rights of persons under investigation. Such a code would
give Congress and the country a yardstick by which to test the
performance of every committee of investigation. Elsewhere I have
31 Charles S. Hyneman, Bureaucracy in a Democracy (1950), Chap-
ter 9.
32
"Congressional Oversight of Administrative Agencies," The Record
of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, January, 1950, pp.
11-29.
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suggested the rules of procedure such a code might contain. 33 It is
also the duty of legislators, as Leonard White has said, "to defend
the public service which they have called into being against unfair
and undeserved attacks. Even more it is their duty to refrain from
such attacks." 34
Supervision of a powerful administration is a formidable
task. The combination of popular control with efficient administra-
tive management is not easy to achieve. It requires continuous
readjustment to changing conditions. While general review of
executive performance is a proper legislative function, under normal
conditions congressional surveillance of the details of administration
is generally impractical and disruptive. In place of detailed
tutelage of the departments, Congress might well endeavor to
improve the administrative system and strengthen its internal con-
trols, along the lines recommended by the Hoover Commission.
For the satisfactory performance of its oversight function, Congress
must rely in the last analysis upon its reorganized standing com-
mittees to inspect and review policy execution; and upon the
over-all supervisory agencies— Budget Bureau, Civil Service Com-
mission, and the General Accounting Office— for surveillance of
the details of administrative conduct.
Conclusion
This paper is confined to the consideration of proposed
reforms connected with three of the basic tasks of Congress: policy
determination, fiscal control, and administrative review. In addition
to these, there are several important procedural reforms which
there is not time enough to analyze in a single essay. Congress
could save much valuable time by adopting a rule of relevancy in
Senate debate, by electric voting in the House, and by holding
joint hearings on similar bills. It could democratize its internal
procedures by providing for majority cloture in the Senate, re-
storing the 21 -day rule in the House, and liberalizing the House
discharge rule. It could reduce its almost intolerable work load by
the delegation of all private legislation, by granting home rule to
the District of Columbia, and by expanding its professional staff
33 George B. Galloway, "Proposed Reforms in Congressional Investi-
gations," University of Chicago Law Review, Spring, 1951, pp. 478-502.
Some of these rules have been embodied by Senator Kefauver in his Senate
Concurrent Resolution 44, 82d Congress, 1st Session.
34 Leonard D. White, New Horizons in Public Administration (1945),
p. 18.
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aids on a merit basis. And it might raise the level of legislative
ethics by outlawing smear methods of campaigning (as Senator
Monroney has urged), allowing defamed citizens to bring damage
suits against the government (as Senator Hunt has suggested),
regulating the use of the congressional frank, and requiring legisla-
tors to disclose the amounts and sources of their extra-curricular
income (which Senator Morse has proposed) . Bills to carry out all
these changes have been repeatedly introduced in both houses of
Congress, but have disappeared in the interstices of the legislative
process.
Thus it will be seen that our national legislature is beset with
many problems of internal mechanism and method and that there
are many recipes in the cook book of congressional reform. While
the causes of discontent with its performance are multiple, Congress
as a body is composed of conscientious, patriotic, and hardworking
men and women whose ethical standards are, with rare exceptions,
high. The chief causes of their difficulties include the tremendous
increase in their responsibilities that has accompanied the expansion
of the federal government and the widening scope of legislation,
the great growth in the work load of Congressmen, their exposure
to the powerful pressures of organized interest groups, and the
use of timeworn machinery and procedures. Robert Luce's prophecy
is disturbing.
Unless methods are changed [he wrote in 1926], the situation
in this respect is sure to become worse, for a steady increase in the
volume of administrative detail is inevitable. The country will keep
on growing, its activities, interests, and needs will keep on expand-
ing. So year by year the petty work of a Congressman will become
more burdensome, and he will perforce be less and less of a states-
man, more and more of a mechanician.30
The further improvement of Congress is a more vital issue for
the welfare of the nation and the world than the outcome of the
congressional elections last fall or the identity of the next presi-
dent. For the machinery and procedures of our national legislature
have become a pivotal point in the determination of fateful na-
tional policies, the control of the public purse, and the conduct of
the administration. The performance of Congress affects the pres-
tige and reputation of representative institutions everywhere.
Important as some of these proposed reforms are, the
political odds seem to be against their adoption, although legislative
35 Luce, op. cit., p. 151.
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miracles sometimes happen as we saw in 1946. Some of the steps
lie within the power of Congress itself to take. Others run counter
to the deep parochialism of American politics, to fixed regional
interests in existing conventions and arrangements, and to the sys-
tem of localized representation. At the heart of the problem of
congressional reform lies the need of inducing Congress to think
nationally. A basic obstacle to progress in this field lies in the fact
that the politics that pay — in terms of re-election and advance-
ment— are local politics.
Sweeping proposals for constitutional reform have a strong
appeal for logical minds, but are probably chimerical. Progress in
the direction of greater party solidarity, discipline, and responsi-
bility holds some signs of promise. Despite their obvious limitations,
the political parties are a potential vehicle for change. No drastic
changes in the basic principles of congressional organization and
operation are needed, writes Professor Holcombe, "but only those
modest improvements that moderate leadership could readily
accomplish with the means already at its disposal." 36 As Professor
Truman remarks, "the prospects for marked and immediate alter-
ation are slight. . . . No sharp and formalized shift from present
practices is imminent. . . . Such changes as occur . . . will be
gradual, slight, and almost imperceptible." 37 In the last analysis,
schemes for congressional reform depend, at least in part, upon the
ability of legislators to lift themselves by their own bootstraps. The
difficulties of such self-elevation are great.
The fate of representative government itself may be at stake.
There is danger lest the people become disillusioned with its pro-
longed delays, its long and often irrelevant debate, its repeated
rejection of popular demands. There is no divine command which
spares the American Congress from the seeds of destruction which
have undermined other great parliaments. If our form of govern-
ment declines and falls, a large part of the responsibility will rest
upon Congress itself for its failure to put its own house in order
and enact legislation the people desire. Representative government
is the keystone of the democratic arch. The eyes of the world are
upon it and the way it works. If Congress is to save itself from the
antidemocratic forces which are challenging it at home and abroad,
then it must act promptly to improve its efficiency and democratize
its methods.
36 Holcombe, op. cit., p. 422.
37 Truman, op. cit., pp. 533-34.
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The professional economist is a relatively recent addition to
the Washington scene. There have long been engineers to design
dams, irrigation projects, postoffice buildings, and other public
works. There have long been medical doctors to guard the health
of the armed forces, of veterans and Indians, and more recently to
protect the purity of our foods and drugs. The ministry of the
gospel has been represented by the military chaplains and by those
who say a prayer over the opening sessions of Congress each day.
Everywhere there have been lawyers occupying dominant positions
in the legislative, executive and judicial branches alike.
Prior to World War I there were very few economists in gov-
ernment positions where they could influence policy. While the
number and importance of economists in government grew to a
considerable extent prior to 1933, the great expansion took place
during the New Deal and the war years which followed.
Along with the increase in both the number and influence of
economists in the Federal Government has come a greatly increased
public interest in economics and what economic science— assuming
there is such a thing— can contribute to individual and national
well-being. The interest was stimulated by the depression, by the
emergence of positive, as distinguished from negative or passive,
economic programs for meeting the depression, by the economic
problems of shifting resources to wartime use and their later recon-
version, by the fear of renewed depression, and in recent years by
the pervasive problem of inflation.
The Council of Economic Advisers
The most distinguished recognition which economics and
economists have received undoubtedly was the Employment Act of
1946 and the establishment of the Council of Economic Advisers.
The Act reflected the fear that the postwar economy would be
marked by a relapse into chronic unemployment, and the belief
Delivered March 24, 1953.
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that through forward-looking integrated economic policy— call it
programming or planning if you prefer-
—
government could in
large measure prevent such a relapse. The fears of the sponsors of
the Employment Act have thus far been largely unrealized although
there was a dip in 1949 that had some economists and many busi-
nessmen deeply concerned. During most of the period of the
Council's existence the problems of economic stability related to
inflation rather than to depression. This has lulled many people
into a complacent attitude regarding the whole question of eco-
nomic policy as it relates to employment.
In the early months of 1953 the Council of Economic Ad-
visers had rather rough sledding. In the transition to the new
Administration, the future of the Council was clouded with doubt.
In the budget for fiscal 1953, adopted in 1952, the House drasti-
cally reduced the Council's budget. Senate friends of the Council
made what seemed to them a good arrangement under which the
level of Council spending could be maintained although appropria-
tions were reduced by the amounts voted in the House, through the
device of ending the appropriation as of March 31, 1953. It was
believed that the new President, whatever his party, would find it
easy to secure additional funds if he wished the Council's work to
continue or expand. What actually happened was that the Congress
voted a somewhat reduced sum of money for an economic adviser
and staff in the White House and voted no money at all for the
Council of Economic Advisers. It thus destroyed the Council, at
least for the time being, despite the fact that the Council was
created by Act of Congress and remains a statutory agency. The
center of hostility to the Council was the chairman of the House
Committee on Appropriations, but the action of Congress could not
have succeeded in the face of a contrary White House recommen-
dation, without a considerable body of added support in the
Congress.
The President, meantime, has appointed as Economic Adviser
Dr. Arthur F. Burns, Research Director of the National Bureau of
Economic Research. Prior to his appointment, the appointments of
the entire remaining staff (which had fallen to 29 persons) lapsed
early in March because of lack of funds. In view of the ability of
many of these persons and the wasteful expenditure involved in
starting fresh, it appears that at least some of the staff will be
re-employed, despite the Congressional criticism of the "old gang"
and the demand that they be completely "cleaned out."
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That Congressional support for the Council, always precari-
ous, declined in recent years can scarcely be doubted. This is not
the same as saying that the influence of the Council on administra-
tion policy or on legislation diminished, or that the quality of the
Council's work declined. As a member of the Council from June,
1950, to August, 1952, I shall leave judgment on these points to
persons less directly concerned than I. Moreover, it is not my pur-
pose to dwell at length on the reasons for the decline of Congres-
sional support of the Council. I believe there were a number of
reasons, among them the continued opposition of many foes of the
original legislation, a diminution in concern for the dangers that
had stimulated the original legislation, and the creation of new
governmental organs to deal with the economic problems growing
out of the rearmament program.
Another significant factor undermining congressional support
for the Council was an apparently growing belief in Congress and
among the general public that the Council was being used "politi-
cally" to support policies proposed by the President rather than to
give the President objective economic advice. Whether this belief
was justified or was merely an invention of Council critics, it was
an effective weapon against the Council. It was convenient, too,
for the enemies of President Truman. The mounting hostility to
the President in Congress tended to be reflected in criticism of the
Council, often in exaggerated form, since less courage was required
to attack the Council than to attack the President.
To examine adequately the questions of what basis existed for
the belief that the Council acted "politically" and the reasons for
the development of this belief would involve me in a lengthy dis-
cussion for which I now have neither time nor inclination. Perhaps
more important than whether the Council was "political" is the
question whether the Council should stand in a different position
with regard to policy issues than other high-ranking government
officials. Should the Council be the only "independent" group in
a situation where all other presidential appointees are expected
publicly to support administration policies? If so, why? Suffice it
to say that the past organization and procedures of the Council
made virtually impossible the avoidance of the charge that the
Council was acting "politically," however innocent its individual
members may have been of that charge.
I have set forth these bits of the life story of the Council
because I wish to center my remarks around the examination of
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some questions regarding the future of the function of giving eco-
nomic advice to the President. This concentration of attention does
not arise from any lack of recognition that in many other places in
the government economists play a large role in shaping policy,
which, in total, is undoubtedly greater than an economic adviser to
the President, or a Council of Economic Advisers, could play. How-
ever, practically all of the difficult questions that are met in con-
sidering the role of the economist in policy formation arise in
regard to the work of the economic adviser to the President, plus
some unique ones that have elicited considerable public interest.
Functions, Attitudes, and Qualifications
of Economists in Government
I am sure that many people do not have a very clear idea, or
at any rate not a very accurate idea, about economists in govern-
ment. For one thing, the term "economist" is ill-defined and
broadly inclusive. In this country a person requires little more than
a large chunk of gall to set up shop and possibly to gain public
recognition as an economist, and a public following for his views.
When economists became important, many people suddenly dis-
covered that they were economists. The public, generally speaking,
has not been well enough informed to distinguish the sheep from
the goats and its idea of economists has not been improved by the
confusion. Another factor which I hesitate to mention on a uni-
versity campus is that many people think of economists as theoret-
ical and lacking in understanding of the very specific and real
problems of business and of government.
Persons with extensive economic training may occupy posi-
tions at many different levels in the Federal hierarchy, not all of
which are of concern in the present discussion. As far as I am
aware, no professional economist has become President of the
United States. However, we have had in the past and have today
professional economists serving as United States senators and repre-
sentatives and holding top political positions in the Executive
Branch. Although these economists are making contributions, often
of a distinguished character, to Federal policy, it is not such top
policy makers at the clearly political level whom I have particularly
in mind in speaking of the role of economists in Federal policy
making. I am as ready as the next economist to maintain that
economic training and practice make an excellent background for
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a person high in political life. But the person at that level is en-
gaged in doing things that by their nature are substantially different
from what we would expect an economist to do in the course of
his profession, and the successful performance of these definitely
political functions calls for capabilities of a character not required
for success as a professional economist.
To publicize legislators and top administrators as economists,
which sometimes has been done, is not an unmixed blessing to the
profession. Their careers show that economists sometimes have the
stuff to rise to higher things, which is good for the profession; but
when their unpopular acts are blamed, as they often are, on the
fact that after all they are economists, the effect on the prestige of
the profession is not good at all.
At the other end of the professional hierarchy, the great
majority of persons in the Federal service who have the civil service
label of economist are engaged in activities that, although im-
mensely important, do not directly have much to do with policy
making. For the most part these economists are digging up facts,
making analyses and otherwise preparing materials, sometimes for
the policy making process, but perhaps more frequently for the
administration and execution of policy.
It is with a relatively small body of economists who are high
enough up in the hierarchy to exercise an influence on policy but
who are not themselves clearly in the political sector that I am
particularly concerned in this discussion, and as I have indicated
my illustrations will relate to the giving of economic advice to the
President.
I am satisfied with the simple idea that making policy is
deciding what ought to be done. A person may be said to influence
policy if it would have been different in the absence of his inter-
vention. "Policy making" commonly refers to the broader and more
general decisions that determine wide areas of action rather than
to more narrow or specific decisions, but I have seen no very useful
line to delimit policy making and feel no very great need for one.
What is the place of the professional economist in Federal
policy making? There is an attitude toward what an economist can
do in developing policy, for which a good name may be "scientific
authoritarianism." By this I mean the idea that is held by many
people and I fear has been cultivated by some economists that the
economist can develop "scientific" solutions for the economic issues
of government. Some economists seem to believe this, as is evi-
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denced by their dogmatic attitude toward policy recommendations,
as well as by the support given to the idea of a sort of "supreme
court of economics," a body that would make authoritative deter-
minations concerning what is economically "sound" and desirable.
The attitude of many members of Congress would indicate that
they also share the illusion that if an economist is objective and
independent he can tell them what "sound" economic policy would
be. This may be at the bottom of the concern which members of
Congress have sometimes indicated about the "independence" of
economists— a concern which is not felt concerning lawyers, poli-
ticians, businessmen, labor leaders or others. There is some talk
about economists "prostituting" themselves by supporting certain
policy positions, while the thought is present that if the economist
sets his hand to a problem of economic policy and approaches it in
an objective fashion he can achieve a scientific solution to it. We
have noneconomists and even economists themselves indicating a
belief that the science of economics is able to arrive at scientific
conclusions regarding what policies ought to be undertaken.
Superficially such a belief is very flattering to the economist,
but actually it involves a basic fallacy and its acceptance is harmful
to the profession of economics. Far from raising the stock of the
economist it puts him in a vulnerable position. For if economists
can arrive at scientific solutions to questions of economic policy,
the fact that economists differ in their conclusions regarding policy
means that at least someone has not been scientific. And since "we"
— whoever we may be— of course are always objective and scien-
tific, those who disagree with us must have failed to be objective
or must have "sold out to the interests" or "prostituted themselves."
This last term seems to have a special fascination for some econ-
omists. The spectacle of economists self-righteously flinging such
epithets at one another is a sad one and cannot fail to cast discredit
on the whole profession. It also suggests that something is seriously
wrong with the whole idea of scientific solutions to economic issues.
That this "scientific authoritarianism" is indeed basically a
fallacy, at least in so far as economic policy is concerned, becomes
clear as we consider what factors are necessary in determining the
desirability of a policy. One factor is a knowledge— or rather a
belief, since beliefs determine action whether they correspond to
reality or not— of what the effects or consequences of a policy
would be. The other factor is a decision regarding what effects or
consequences it is desired to achieve. If two persons differ substan-
70
tially about what are, or would be, the effects of a policy, they are
likely to differ about the desirability of the policy. If they differ
regarding what effects it is desirable to achieve they will almost
certainly differ about the desirability of the policy.
Here, then, is the key point: To forecast the effects of a
policy is a difficult problem, but it is one at least theoretically
capable of scientific solution, just as forecasting the effects of drop-
ping a stone in a pool of water is at least theoretically capable of
scientific solution; but to determine whether these effects would be
desirable involves adopting a pattern of value priorities. It involves
deciding what is important and desirable in life. It is a normative
problem. No scientific solution is even theoretically possible of the
problem of what people ought to want, and whether one person's
pattern of value priorities is intrinsically better than that of another.
And if this be true it is impossible for scientific study alone to
determine the desirability of a policy and impossible for economists
to arrive at authoritative determinations of what ought to be done
in the field of economic policy.
There are value systems which some people recognize as
authoritative and as setting the foundations for private and public
action. Sometimes the source of the authority is theological. Some-
times it is a political dictatorship. In a democracy where the separa-
tion of church and state prevails, neither of these kinds of value
systems can be recognized as defining authoritatively the public
interest for purposes of governmental action. Neither of these
value systems is scientific, and the positivist idea that science can
achieve its own system of normative values, while at one time
widely believed, is by now generally discredited.
Let us make the application of these ideas to the role of the
economist in policy making. The economist should be better able
than persons specializing in other fields than economics to measure
the trends of the economy and to forecast future developments by
which the adequacy of policy is largely to be judged. Moreover, the
economist should be better able than other people to indicate the
economic effects that may be expected to flow from a proposed or
actual change in policy. Even in the areas nearest the scientific
level, of course, economists often find themselves in disagreement.
Although the problems conceptually are subject to scientific solu-
tion, we know from experience that with respect to many, perhaps
most, policies there is wide disagreement regarding their conse-
quences. Fortunately there are very large areas of agreement. But
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economists have not been able to reach general agreement, for
example, on the incidence of some kinds of taxes. They disagree
regarding the effectiveness of monetary restriction in controlling
inflationary or deflationary movements. They disagree regarding
the effects of high wages on employment, productivity and eco-
nomic stability. The disagreements stem in part from the immense
complications of economic affairs, in part from the fact that eco-
nomics is still only a rudimentary science. They stem also in con-
siderable part from the training, background, economic position,
and general philosophical point of view of the economist. These
affect what he considers important : in other words, they affect his
values and thereby his economic analysis. It is unfortunately true
that while research cannot demonstrate the validity of basic values,
values may undermine the validity of research.
What are these values that interfere with scientific authori-
tarianism? Do we not all seek to achieve them and if so, where is
the problem? These values or objectives of economic life may be
variously grouped. One major economic objective is maximum
production; a related one is maximum quantity of goods available
for consumption. There may be a conflict here between maximum
quantity of consumer goods available today and maximum quantity
available at some later time made possible through a high rate
today of saving and investment. Another important objective is
the maintenance and promotion of a way of life in which the
dignity of the individual and the growth of his personality are
recognized and promoted. Security, liberty, participation in control
of one's own activities, and so on, contribute in varying degrees to
help achieve this objective. Another important objective in a free
society is a just and reasonable distribution or sharing of the eco-
nomic product. This is a powerful objective although no one has
been able to define justice in an authoritative manner or to gen-
eral satisfaction.
Now of course almost all of us strongly believe in the promo-
tion of all these values. When it is possible to promote them all
simultaneously there is not much difficulty in reaching agreement
on policy. But when the promotion of one value or objective in-
volves the sacrifice of other values, there is always a problem of
which value is more important. The question is not a general one;
it is not very enlightening to argue which in general is more im-
portant, production or liberty, because we all insist on some of
both. The question of which value to promote is thus one that
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applies in a specific situation where a little more of one is chosen
at the expense of having a little less of the other.
It is in this choosing which is more important, a little more
of one of these values or a little more of another, that persons
differ. That is, the relative values, or pattern of value priorities,
will differ among persons. Each person has his own pattern of
priorities. No person is in a position to demonstrate authoritatively
that his pattern is more correct than that of another person. If
anything can be demonstrated it is only that one pattern of value
priorities may be more consistently attainable over a long period
of time than can another. This is helpful but not definitive, since
there may be various patterns that are consistently attainable.
The objectives or values that I have been talking about are
objectives or values that are deemed to be in the public interest. In
point of fact, of course, the differences of opinion over policy often
arise simply from a conflict of private interests. For example, busi-
nessmen want their taxes lowered, so do consumers, but to lower
the burden of one may require increasing the burden of the other;
high farm prices may mean high food costs; high urban wages may
mean high farm costs; protective tariffs help some industries but
harm others; and so on. It is probably correct to say that most
struggles over policy are conflicts of private interests. We may hope
that they are solved by our policy makers deciding which private
interest is in the public interest. The policy maker presumably rises
above his own self interest— although this assumption seems often
contrary to the fact— but he must face the pressures of conflicting
private demands of others. It is the responsibility of the policy
maker to decide these conflicts on the basis of how the private
interests affect the public interest, as measured by the public
objectives and values previously referred to. Of course, in this
concept of policy making, public interest, as I have suggested in
The Federal Taxing Process, is not viewed as "something that can
be objectively determined or measured. It is, rather, a highly
individual view of what makes the 'good society.' It is the gleam
in a man's eye of the way to promote a better world." 1 Unfor-
tunately it is hard for each of us to avoid the belief that what is
in his own private interest is also in the public interest, and this
difficulty is present also in policy makers.
In our system of government the compromises and choices
1 Roy Blough, The Federal Taxing Process (New York: Prentice-
Hall, 1952) pp. 7-8.
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among private interests and the determination of what pattern of
value priorities constitutes the public interest is determined by
politicians— and I use the word in its correct and not its degraded
sense. Economists can sharpen the issues, they can analyze the
alternative effects of different policies, they can help perform the
engineering job of turning policy decisions into effective action,
but they cannot as economists make the choices among private
interests and the choices among public values that constitute the
central task of policy making. Because of the difficulty of segregat-
ing different functions, politicians often perform the functions of
economists, at which we economists shudder, and economists some-
times perform the functions of politicians, at which we may also
in some circumstances rightfully shudder. I hasten to say that this
mixing of functions is common and often unavoidable. The impli-
cation, however, is that when an economist finds it necessary to
engage in value judgments, which he very often must do as an
economic adviser, he should remember that in that respect he is
not the scientific economist seeking and applying truth, but the
representative of the people trying to meet their legitimate inter-
ests in the light of what he deems to be the public interest. That
is, he is performing not a scientific but a political function — and
"political" is a term that should carry with it no aura of scientific
authoritarianism.
A related point is that economists would be well advised to
correct the impression that they consider their own work objective
or that economists can be truly objective. The economist has the
fundamental duty to be as objective as he possibly can, but this is
not achieved by the bland belief that he has the best of intentions
and is therefore objective. The economist should use all the methods
open to him to check the accuracy of his observations and analyses
and to offset his inbred biases. But, since economic observations and
analyses— even the decision as to what is important to study—
are determined largely by the background, training, and experience,
as well as by the emotions of the economist, different economists
will reach different results even in those areas of their work where
there is conceptually the possibility of scientific determination. It
behooves economists to have more humility than is observed in the
pronouncements which many of us make on economic matters.
We all have known persons who sincerely believed themselves to
be objective but who yet had the most obvious and tremendous
biases. Sincerity is a good thing but it is no guarantee of
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objectivity. Self-delusion is one of the easiest achievements in the
world, and one that leaves us with a fine, clear conscience; but it
is nonetheless delusion, not truth.
Another fact which the economist in government must rec-
ognize is that matters other than the economic are important.
Indeed, the economic is a means to an end, the end being usually
found in psychological, social, political, and other areas. The
economist must recognize that he is no authority on the results that
may flow from policy in these other fields that may be as important
or more important than the economic. Moreover, he is ill-equipped
for his task if he does not recognize that the economic interpretation
of individual behavior as well as of national history is inadequate,
lopsided, and misleading.
As long as I am somewhat rashly discussing the qualifications
of economists, I shall make another point that I consider important.
I believe that for an economist to do effective work in the field of
governmental policy it is necessary that he accept a considerably
wider concept of economics than may be recognized in some of
our institutions of learning. The body of economic theory is in gen-
eral based on an analysis of how rational persons would behave in
promoting their optimum individual economic positions. I agree
that this is the backbone of what determines most economic be-
havior. But there are two other factors that also must be taken into
serious consideration. The first is the tendency of the individual to
do what other people are doing, to be swept along in a mass move-
ment. Stock market booms are not just the reflection of the rational
calculation of the effect of other people's purchases on the prices
of stocks; they are a condition of fever that gets into people and
causes them to do things that under other circumstances they
would recognize as having no rational basis. Much of what we do
depends on this mass movement; propaganda, advertising, political
campaigns, and lynchings depend on it. If an economist is to make
a prediction of the effects of a policy, he cannot eliminate this
element from his calculations and use only individual rationality,
without giving wrong advice on many occasions. But he is hired to
tell what would happen if some policy were adopted, not to tell
what ought to happen if people acted only the way economic
theory says they should act in a highly artificial, abstract world.
There is likewise another factor affecting the behavior of
persons that must be taken into account if there is to be an ade-
quate analysis of the probable effects of policy changes. Customs,
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trade practices, union rules, conspiracies, etc., operate as a form
of government outside the political sphere and have an important
impact on human behavior. People sometimes react in certain ways
not because of their individual rational analysis or because of a
mass movement of feeling, but because the rules of the game, formal
or informal, are such that they must react that way. It is interest-
ing to compare the reactions of certain persons, for example, busi-
nessmen or labor leaders, to some governmental policy in their
public statements and acts, and in their private comments. How-
ever they may feel personally, they are bound in their formal
reaction by the code of their group.
Considerations Regarding the Future of the Council
The Federal agency set up to bring economic advice to bear
on top policy is the Council of Economic Advisers. In considering
what should be done with the Council of Economic Advisers there
are a number of points on which decision must be reached.
The first of these questions is whether there is any need at
all for the Council, and if so, what functions it should perform.
A government firmly adhering to laissez faire has no need for
economic advice, for it has already accepted its economic advice.
But if government is to act, then clearly the economic considera-
tions are very important ones, although not the only ones that need
to be taken into account. Ours is not a laissez faire government
and there are many economists in the various agencies of the gov-
ernment who are engaged in explaining economic considerations
to policy making officials. This has been true for decades, and
particularly since the late 1920's or early 1930's. In view of the
fact that the different agencies of the Executive Branch are
actually performing the work of government, why cannot the econo-
mists of these agencies furnish all the economic advice needed?
What peculiar functions can the Council perform that call for a
special organization?
In the first place, it needs to be recognized that the function
of Federal policy making is one around which there is great compe-
tition. Each of the "departments" — a word used for convenience
to cover not only the departments of the Federal Government, but
also its numerous other agencies— seeks to formulate the policy of
the Executive Branch in its field, which as interpreted often over-
laps the fields of other departments. The departments are likely to
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develop a considerable degree of independence of the President.
Some of them were set up to promote the special interests of
particular economic groups. The Department of Labor, for ex-
ample, was set up as a separate agency in order to assure the
representation of labor interests in the Executive Branch. The
Department of Agriculture has its clientele as does the Department
of the Interior. The various departments have close ties to the
Congress. Their programs are largely determined by particular
congressional committees while the extent to which the programs
are carried out is determined largely by the appropriation com-
mittees. The heads of the agencies are empowered to execute the
legislation. Where does the President fit into this picture? He can
control the head of the agency if time and inclination permit, but
generally his only actual power is that of removal. Ordinarily the
legislation does not empower the President to order the head of
any agency to do or not do something. There have been examples
of heads of agencies who remained high in the official family for
years carrying out their own points of view, protected by the
unwillingness of the President to remove them from office.
Thus the organization of the Federal Government facilitates
the development of widely diverse and often conflicting policies.
The various clienteles outside government, the specialized con-
gressional committees, the bureaucracy living close to the program
of the department, and department heads who can be controlled
only by removal, are factors that combine to make diverse policies
inevitable. The result is at least to a considerable extent self-
destructive and in any event costly to the government. If farmers
are to have at least parity of prices, if workers are to have at least
parity of wages, and if business concerns are to have at least parity
of profits, it is just possible that the economy will not grow fast
enough to keep everyone reasonably happy, with the result either
of inflation or serious political controversy, or both.
This last point suggests that this plethora of policies results
not only in conflict and competition among them, but also in con-
flict with the goal of economic stability. There are "some econo-
mists who are ready to assign to each of the various governmental
agencies a specific policy or policies that it is supposed to promote,
and to assign the job of economic stability to the central bankers,
in our case primarily the Federal Reserve System. I wish I could
accept this handy little device of neatly dividing policy functions
among departments. Even if it could be achieved, and would work,
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there would still be need to avoid the conflicts among policies, and
this in itself would, I believe, require that the President have near
him capable economists with no axes to grind who would tell him
the effects of different economic policies and help him to improve
the situation somewhat, or at least to prevent still greater conflict
of policies, as time went on. But it occurs to me that most
economists would agree that the policies of all the agencies of
government affect economic stability, if in no other way than
through their expenditures and receipts. In a period of excessive
demand the payment of several billions in veterans' insurance
refunds cannot help adversely affecting economic stability. An
unemployment insurance system that calls for higher tax rates
when unemployment increases undoes some of the stabilizing effects
of compensation payments. The war years would have been an
excellent time to raise old age insurance tax rates since the rate
being collected was far below the cost of the insurance being built
up; such rate increases would have contributed to economic
stability. Low interest rates on government securities and housing
loans were maintained in a period of inflation. Grants in aid for
highways were increased at a time when materials were scarce and
inflationary pressures were strong. In some of these cases the
responsible administrative authority, and in other cases the Con-
gress, was unwilling to allow the goal of economic stability to
interfere with the achievement of more specialized policy goals. It
is perfectly clear that only through the President can the general
goal of economic stability have a chance to have an effective
impact on Federal policy. How much chance this goal has to make
such an impact is a question, but the chance is certainly greater at
the presidential than at the departmental level.
The protection of the President as the chief policy maker is a
basic consideration that calls for having an economist close to him.
But why go to the trouble of having a special office with a high
rank in the hierarchy? Why not simply have one of the President's
"anonymous" administrative assistants be a capable economist and
let it go at fhat? Of course, this assumes that the President would
have the confidence required for him to listen to such an assistant's
advice. But given this assumption there are two reasons that
immediately come to mind for having a high-ranking economist as
adviser. The first is that only such a person can have influence on
the various persons who make policy. It has become increasingly
recognized that it is the "presidency" rather than the President
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who makes "White House" policy. No man can really digest the
enormous body of issues that must be decided; in large measure
the President must accept what is prepared for him by the officials
with whom he has surrounded himself. These officials are on his
own staff, in the Bureau of the Budget, in the principal depart-
ments, and so on. If the economic adviser to the President is to
function successfully he must have the stature and the position to
sit on the policy-making committees and make his voice heard
along with the highest officials in the land. This requires a person
— or persons— of sufficient personal prestige that with the Presi-
dent's backing he will be able to influence this body of policy
makers.
In the second place, no man— and no three men— can have
a sufficient knowledge to be a trusted authority in every field of
economics in which policy decisions must be made. To supply him
— or them— with the needed knowledge, he— or they— must
have a staff of highly qualified economists studying the work of
the different agencies, meeting with the high-level economic per-
sonnel of these agencies, preparing necessary memoranda, and
briefing the adviser. Such an agency could be headed successfully
only by a top-ranking person or persons.
If, then, there should be an economic adviser or Council of
Economic Advisers to the President, what should his functions be?
Is the frame of reference set up for the Council by the Employment
Act of 1946 adequate? In general I believe it is adequate and
perhaps more than adequate. There is some language in the Act,
the meaning of which is puzzling, and language that incorporates
possibly inconsistent objectives among the goals to be achieved.
More explicit reference to the maintenance of the purchasing
power of the dollar might well have been made in the Act,
although I believe the desirability of such maintenance is implied.
But such defects in the Act do not affect the broad range of
functions allocated to the Council. Allow me to enumerate these
functions as set forth in Section 4 (c) of the Employment Act.
It shall be the duty and function of the Council—
(1) to assist and advise the President in the preparation of the
Economic Report;
(2) to gather timely and authoritative information concerning
economic developments and economic trends, both current and prospec-
tive, to analyze and interpret such information in the light of the policy
declared in section 2 for the purpose of determining whether such devel-
79
opments and trends are interfering, or are likely to interfere, with the
achievement of such policy, and to compile and submit to the President
studies relating to such developments and trends;
(3) to appraise the various programs and activities of the Federal
Government in the light of the policy declared in section 2 for the
purpose of determining the extent to which such programs and activities
are contributing, and the extent to which they are not contributing, to
the achievement of such policy, and to make recommendations to the
President with respect thereto;
(4) to develop and recommend to the President national economic
policies to foster and promote free competitive enterprise, to avoid eco-
nomic fluctuations or to diminish the effects thereof, and to maintain
employment, production, and purchasing power;
(5) to make and furnish such studies, reports thereon, and recom-
mendations with respect to matters of Federal economic policy and
legislation as the President may request.
You will observe that this very broad list of functions re-
quires the Council of Economic Advisers to go beyond what I have
referred to as the scientific aspect of economics into the political
function, since only by so doing can the Council make recommen-
dations of the character called for. If the policy to which its rec-
ommendations were directed by statute were a very restricted and
specific one, the political function would be minimized. Section 2
of the Act to which the list of Council functions refers, however,
is a very broad statement of objectives
:
The Congress hereby declares that it is the continuing policy and
responsibility of the Federal Government to use all practicable means
consistent with its needs and obligations and other essential considerations
of national policy, with the assistance and cooperation of industry, agri-
culture, labor, and State and local governments, to coordinate and
utilize all its plans, functions, and resources for the purpose of creating
and maintaining, in a manner calculated to foster and promote free
competitive enterprise and the general welfare, conditions under which
there will be afforded useful employment opportunities, including self-
employment, for those able, willing, and seeking to work, and to promote
maximum employment, production, and purchasing power.
It is difficult to think of economic recommendations that would
relate to matters not comprehended in this statement of objectives.
Thus the Council of Economic Advisers is instructed to set itself up
as a judge of value priorities as well as to deal with problems of a
scientific character. It is directed to have in mind many consider-
ations, not merely economic aspects, for it must consider "its (the
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Federal Government's) needs and obligations and other essential
considerations of national policy," as well as that comprehensive
term "the general welfare." While the subject matter of the Coun-
cil is more specifically the economic goal (or goals) of promoting
"maximum employment, production, and purchasing power," in
making recommendations the Council is instructed to take a view
much broader than the strictly economic.
In view of these provisions of the Employment Act it seems
reasonably clear that the Council is called upon to go beyond the
function of the professional economist and to become part of the
political process. Why then should the Council be criticized for
being political? One reason may be that the critics fail to under-
stand the limitations on scientific economics previously discussed.
Another reason may be that the Council members are expected to
exercise the political aspects of their function with complete inde-
pendence of partisan politics— to be, if not authoritative, at least
independent. While I am inclined to believe that both reasons may
be involved, I believe that the latter reason is the primary one. In
the case of some of the critics, however, I believe it became mixed
up with the idea that if the Council did not criticize the position
that the President took it was indulging in partisan politics, a
rather curious view since it would exclude the possibility that the
President might agree with the Council and might indeed be per-
suaded by them.
If anyone really thought the Council would publicly disagree
with the President, he showed no great understanding of the
advisory function. A confidential advisory relationship could not
survive a situation where, having advised the President, the Coun-
cil called the attention of Congress and the public to the fact that
he had not followed the advice. The political enemies of every
president are lying in wait for just such opportunities to destroy
him. The Council would immediately cease to advise the President
if it were so naive or so unsympathetic as to publicly criticize him.
So it seems that if the Council agrees publicly with the President, it
will be called political, while if it disagrees publicly with the
President, it will be doing the President political harm and will
cease to advise him.
Even if the law were changed or the Council avoided making
recommendations— and I doubt if any President would permit
the Council to abandon this function— the risks of dealing with
Congress or of making public statements would not be eliminated.
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As I previously mentioned, the economic aspects of public ques-
tions are numerous and complicated. Some pattern of priorities
must be applied in evaluating the economic effects of policy. This
evaluation is at bottom a political function. For the Council of
Economic Advisers to analyze and publicize the probable economic
effects of policies with no application of value priorities, assuming
this were possible, which is doubtful, would be largely meaningless
to the general public, who would have neither time, patience, nor
ability to make sense out of an unevaluated mess such as this
would be.
So I am afraid that despite the great good that the Council
could do and has done through public statements, it is not in the
cards for such activities to be consistent with a reputation for
being non-political. Of course, there are degrees. The Council
might stay on the sidelines in controversial matters and limit its
public statements to facts, forecasts and generalized economic state-
ments which, while of value for public and congressional education,
would not be open to major criticism. But this would not, in my
judgment, save the Council. It was my experience that many
members of Congress, for example, were not very much interested
in discussing economic effects of policies, in any general way; they
wanted to proceed as quickly as possible to ask specific questions
about the policy views of the Council.
Even the publishing of forecasts can be a risky business for
the Council. Publishing forecasts is dangerous to one's professional
standing because they so often turn out to be wrong. Indeed, one
theory of forecasting is that a good forecast should so modify the
actions of persons and governments that the forecast will not be
realized. The Council would get little credit for making a forecast
of either deflation or inflation that turned out not to be an accurate
forecast, even if making the forecast resulted in action which cor-
rected the economic situation. Forecasts are also dangerous politi-
cally. If a downturn in business is officially forecast and actually
takes place, there is likely to be a good deal of critical reaction on
the ground that the forecast caused the downturn. The inflationary
forecasts of the summer and autumn of 1950 were later criticized
as having stimulated the speculative activity which contributed to
the inflation.
There is, moreover, the fact that an administration is not
likely to recognize or at least to acknowledge publicly that the
policies it has followed are leading either to business depression or
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inflation. Of course, there may be no real connection, but just as
the administration will receive and accept the credit for the favor-
able economic developments, it is certain to be charged with the
unfavorable ones; to forecast an unfavorable development is tanta-
mount to acknowledging that the policies are unsound. There are
possible exceptions. A new administration could seek to lay the
blame on the previous one. Moreover, when the Administration and
the Congress are in a bitter battle over policy, the Administration
can forecast undesirable developments, blaming them on the un-
willingness of the Congress to accept the Administration's policies.
But this is hardly a political situation to be hoped for or one on
which a general conclusion can rest.
An anecdote that was told about the Council as it was con-
stituted before the resignation of the first chairman was to the
effect that one member talked only to Congress, a second member
talked to everyone except Congress, while the third member talked
to everyone. It seems clear that Congress wanted the Council to
talk to it and that a radical departure from this position may
adversely affect the relations of the Council with Congress. Never-
theless, the policy of talking with Congress seems not to have pro-
duced a very happy result. On the other hand, it is not enough that
the Council stay away from the Congress. To avoid the charge of
politics the economic advisers would have to limit their public
speeches and writing to very innocuous aspects of their work.
Indeed, I doubt if they could avoid being virtually anonymous
during their period of service. This admittedly would involve a
great loss in public education and in publicizing the importance of
economics to the public interest.
My opinion, to summarize, is that if the Council makes its
views known to the public or to Congress it may be assured that
whatever those views may be it will be called a political Council.
It may be able to avoid this label by maintaining silence.
There will certainly be a difference of opinion whether under
these circumstances the Council should publicly state and support
its views, including its statements of policy with which the President
does not disagree. I very much doubt if the Council's recommenda-
tions to the President in the past were in any way affected by the
publicity aspect. Beyond that I can say that I was never asked by
the President to change any of my views or to take any position
publicly. I did not recommend either publicly or privately any
policy which I did not believe was desirable and I have no reason
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to believe that any other Council member did differently in this
respect. However, since an inexorable part of the confidential
advisorv relationship is that the Council member must remain
silent on such of his views as the President may reject, the support
of the policies on which there is agreement presents a problem. I
am afraid there is no escape from the danger that for the Council
to remain silent on some of its policy views while promoting others
may involve an element of misrepresentation to a Congress and
public that expects the Council to be an independent body. The
opportunity to attain such independence and to achieve a reputa-
tion for independence is so rare in government that I believe it is
to the advantage of both the Council and the President to forego
anv apparent benefit that may come from having the Council
publicly support the President's policies in which it may believe.
I think I should say that I look on these remarks about re-
porting to Congress and the public as a general rule to which there
are undoubtedly important exceptions. Some persons have smooth
sailing in matters of this kind where others continually have rough
going.
Another question of importance is whether the personnel of
the Council should be expected to continue with a change of the
President or of the Party in power. This is pretty much an aca-
demic question as far as a change in party is concerned, since no
political partv would be willing to admit, even by implication, that
it did not have better economists than the other party. Even high-
ranking physical scientists in the government are likely to feel the
impact of party change, and economists are far closer to the polit-
ical arena than are physical scientists. If the economic advisers to
the President are to have or even to merit his confidence, they
must have a pattern of value priorities similar to his own. If the
new President has a substantially different pattern of value priori-
ties from his predecessor, he would need different economic advisers
since the adviser would be called upon to make recommendations
or do other tasks that involved applying value judgments. If the
President is to be able to follow the adviser's recommendations
without a great deal of personal study, the two must have similar
patterns of value priority.
The viewpoint that the economic adviser should be immune
from the tide of battle is inconsistent with the view that his advice
should be taken seriously. You cannot as a public official give public
advice in matters involving public policy without being considered
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part of the political machinery. It would, of course, be useful to be
able to maintain a degree of continuity in the Council; this should
be possible through the retention of staff, who surely do not need
to be involved in the political aspects of economic advice. The
experience of the 1953 change in party control, however, indicates
that even staff members, who often privately held opinions quite
different from those publicly believed to be held by the Council,
could not survive the change in party control of the government.
Still another question is whether there should be a Council
of three persons, or only one, or perhaps a larger group. I do not
think this is necessarily a problem of major significance. The ability
of the Council to be a success or the probability of its being a
failure is not dependent to a major degree on the number of
members. My own preference is for a single member, for several
reasons. A Council of more than three might function effectively if
membership were ex officio with an active secretariat, but this
might subject the operation to control by the departments. The
only purpose that would seem to be served by a group of specially
appointed advisers larger than three would be in case the Council
were called upon to determine policy independent of the President.
In such case the Council would be acting as a political body and
would need to be large enough to give representation to various
points of view, thus becoming a legislative arm.
A Council of three members could be organized in two main
ways. The first way, which has applied more or less in the past,
would be for the members to have equal prerogatives, with all
members participating equally not only in determining Council
opinion but also in inter-departmental committees, interviews with
the President, and all other activities. The difficulty with this form
of operation is that much of the effective work of the Council in
bringing economic thinking to bear on policy can be done by only
one person at a time. If all members are to be present the result
may well be that none will be present. In arriving at opinions, it is
presumed that three heads are better than one. This ought to be
true but the history of three-man bodies is not very reassuring.
Persons otherwise qualified by age and experience for membership
are likely to be rather firmly fixed in their general philosophy if
not in their specific views of economic matters; the result of dis-
cussion among them may well be a product that is the lowest
common denominator rather than one that is better than the best
which anyone could have achieved by himself. Perhaps my thinking
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on this point is somewhat dominated by my experience over the
years in the operation of three-man bodies, both from the viewpoint
'
of the staff and from the viewpoint of a member— experience
which does not lead me to view three-man bodies with much
optimism.
A second way of organizing a three-man Council, which
would represent a new departure, would be to give the Chairman
a different role from the other members, in that he would control
the administration of the staff and would represent the Council in
its outside dealings. Each of the other members presumably would
have an equal voice with the Chairman in determining Council
opinions and conclusions. The chief comment that I would make
about this arrangement is that the position of the Chairman would
be a distinguished one while the positions of the other members
would be anomalous. Would the Chairman really do justice to
Council opinions in which the other members both disagreed with
him? If he failed to press his own view, would he not feel that he
was guilty of sponsoring error? In practice, a high-ranking staff
member might well be in a considerably more influential position
than the second or third member of the Council. Persons appointed
by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate could
scarcely hold positions of that kind with self respect. My guess
would be that qualified persons could not be found to take the
position, or that if they were and did accept, they either would not
remain long or would become trouble makers.
Those who fear that a single member would be too arbitrary
have a point, but it is a point that can be met by designating the
right man as adviser and surrounding him with a first-class staff.
The job is of such magnitude that it cannot properly be done
without at least as numerous a staff as the peak staff of the Council,
which approached a total of forty, and in my opinion a somewhat
larger staff would be needed for maximum effectiveness. Borrowing
staff from departments and agencies might cut down the apparent
number on the Council payroll.
While the terms of reference of the Employment Act are
sufficiently broad, the Council suffers from a failure to be inte-
grated into the policy making machinery of the government. There
is no such automatic position as is held by the Budget Bureau,
through which must pass all proposed legislation, although even
the Budget Bureau is not infrequently by-passed by one method or
another. The Council simply has had no regular method of being
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consulted on proposed legislation. This is a serious defect that
requires correction. The policy of the Executive is not made in a
lump and often is not made in a very formal manner. It is likely
to be made speech by speech, message by message, bill by bill. The
policy pronouncements of the Economic Report of the President
usually, although not invariably, have been mere compilations of
measures and policies that had previously been determined upon,
not new determinations of major policies. Unless the Council is in
a position to bring its economic intelligence to bear on the determi-
nations of these policies piece by piece, it finds itself on the outside
looking in on the policy-making process.
Moreover, a very large fraction of policy is made not through
legislation but through the framing of administrative regulations or
even in the day-to-day decisions that must be made in putting
legislation into effect. There is no provision for the Council to take
an effective part in this process, except to the extent that the
President concerns himself with the decisions and calls on the
Council for its opinion. To limit the Council to telling whether
prosperity, inflation, or depression is ahead and making comments
on the broad directions of Federal policy is not the way to achieve
either the integration of economic policy or the modification of
that policy in the interests of economic stability and growth.
Economics should play an important role in the formation of
policy. The disregard of the existence of economic cause and effect
has given us many policies that are unintelligible in that they do
not achieve what is desired. The low priority given to general
economic considerations of stability and growth among the various
considerations that determine policy has often interfered with the
achievement of stability and growth. The fragmentation of policy,
with governmental action striking out in many directions at the
same time, leads to expense and the frustration of policy. It will
take more than a clear understanding of the economic implications
of policies to bring about a satisfactory situation, but a clear under-
standing would help.
The role of the economist in policy making is largely that of
determining the implications of policy and making them clear to
the persons on whom responsibility for making final decisions rests.
This is a sufficient role for a social scientist to be content to fill. In
the higher economic positions he will be asked to go beyond this
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role and to make policy recommendations. He will probably be
eager to take this step, and it is entirely proper that he should do
so. However, this is usually the point in the hierarchy of govern-
ment beyond which it becomes increasingly difficult to make a
successful transition to a new political administration that has a
substantially different pattern of value priorities. It is difficult to
enjoy an important position in policy making without being subject
to political risks. It is not possible, at least in a democratic govern-
ment, to take the politics out of policy making.
The creation of the Council of Economic Advisers was a long
step forward in the recognition of the place of economics and the
economist. Its position is temporarily clouded; I hope the clouds
will soon clear away. I confidently look forward to a strengthening
of the position of the economists in government either through
revival and improvement of the Council, or in the form of some
new experiment. I do not believe that any setback in this area can
be for long; the demands of the times require more, not less, use of
the economist and economics in the development of governmental
policy.
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